Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy by DOLIGALSKI, Pawel & ROJAS, Luis E.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECO 2016/11 
Department of Economics 
 
Optimal Redistribution with a Shadow Economy 
Paweł Doligalski and Luis E. Rojas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
European University Institute 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 
Optimal Redistribution with a Shadow Economy  
 
Paweł Doligalski and Luis E. Rojas 
EUI Working Paper ECO 2016/11 
 
  
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1725-6704 
 
© Paweł Doligalski and Luis E. Rojas, 2016 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
Optimal Redistribution with a Shadow Economy
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Abstract
We examine the constrained e cient allocations in the Mirrlees (1971) model with an informal
sector. There are two labor markets: formal and informal. The planner observes only income
from the formal market. We show that the shadow economy can be welfare improving through
two channels. It can be used as a shelter against tax distortions, raising the e ciency of
labor supply, and as a screening device, benefiting redistribution. We calibrate the model
to Colombia, where 58% of workers are employed informally. The optimal share of shadow
workers is close to 22% for the Rawlsian planner and less than 1% for the Utilitarian planner.
The optimal tax schedule is very di↵erent then the one implied by the Mirrlees (1971) model
without the informal sector.
Keywords: shadow economy, informal labor market, income taxation, redistribution
JEL codes: H21, H26, J46
1 Introduction
Informal activity, defined broadly as any endeavor which is not necessarily illegal but evades taxa-
tion, accounts for a large fraction of economic activity in both developing and developed economies.
According to Jutting, Laiglesia, et al. (2009) more then half of the jobs in the non-agricultural
sector worldwide can be considered informal. Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2011) estimate
the share of informal production in the GDP of high income OECD countries in the years 1999-
2007 as 13.5%. Given this evidence, the informal sector should be considered in the design of fiscal
policy. This paper extends the theory of the optimal redistributive taxation by Mirrlees (1971) to
the economies with an informal labor market.
⇤Pawe l Doligalski: European University Institute, pawel.doligalski@eui.eu. Luis Rojas: European University
Institute, luis.rojas@eui.eu. We are grateful for useful comments of A´rpa´d A´braha´m, Charles Brendon, Antoine
Camous, Hal Cole, Piero Gottardi, Ramon Marimon, Wojciech Kopczuk, Dirk Krueger, Humberto Moreira, Erwin
Ooghe, Wojciech Paczos and Evi Pappa, as well as the seminar participants at the WIEM 2014 Conference, the
Central Bank of Hungary, the Royal Economic Society 2015 Annual Conference, the IEB Workshop on Economics
of Taxation, the Econometric Society 2015 World Congress and the European Economic Association 2015 Annual
Congress, the University of Essex, the Bristol University, the University of Mannheim and the University of Barcelona.
Pawe l Doligalski thanks the Central Bank of Hungary for the possibility of working on this project during his stay
there. All mistakes are ours.
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The ability of the state to redistribute income depends on how responsive to taxes individuals
are. When incomes are very elastic, di↵erential taxation of di↵erent individuals is hard, because
workers adjust their earnings to minimize the tax burden.1 The shadow economy allows workers to
earn additional income which is unobserved by the government. Without shadow economy, workers
respond to taxes only by changing their total labor supply. With the shadow economy, they can
additionally shift labor between the formal and the informal sector, which increases the elasticity
of their formal income. As incomes in the formal economy become more elastic, redistribution
becomes more di cult.
We show that the government can exploit di↵erences in informal productivity between workers
to improve redistribution. Suppose there are two types of workers: skilled and unskilled. The
responsiveness of the skilled workers determines the taxes they pay and the transfers the unskilled
receive. In the world without the shadow economy, this responsiveness depends on how easy it is for
the skilled to reduce income to the level of the unskilled worker. If that happens, the government
cannot tax di↵erentially the two types of individuals. In the world with the shadow economy, the
government can improve redistribution in the following way. By increasing taxes at low levels of
formal income, the unskilled workers are pushed to informality. If the unskilled workers can easily
find a good informal job, this transition will not hurt them much. Now the skilled workers can
avoid taxes only if they too move to the shadow economy. Hence, the responsiveness of the skilled
workers depends on their informal productivity. If the skilled workers su↵er a large productivity
loss by moving to the other sector, the government can tax them more in the formal sector and
provide higher transfers to the unskilled informal workers. In the opposite case, however, when the
skilled can easily move between sectors while the unskilled cannot, the government cannot use the
shadow economy to discourage the skilled workers from reducing formal income. In such a case,
redistribution will be reduced.
The shadow economy also a↵ects the e ciency of labor allocation by sheltering workers from tax
distortions.2 The labor supply of formal workers is determined jointly by their formal productivity
and a marginal tax rate they face. In contrast, the labor supply of informal workers depends only
on their informal production opportunity and is una↵ected by tax distortions. When their informal
productivity is not much lower than the formal one, informal workers will produce more than if
they stayed in the formal sector. In this way the shadow economy improves the allocation of labor
and raises e ciency.
Whether the shadow economy is harmful or beneficial from the social welfare perspective depends
on its joint impact on redistribution and e ciency. The informal sector improves redistribution if
the workers that pay high taxes cannot easily move to the shadow economy. It benefits e ciency if
informal workers have similar productivities in formal and informal sector. As a rule of a thumb,
we can say that the shadow economy raises welfare if it allows poor workers who collect transfers to
earn some additional money, but does not tempt the rich taxpayers to reduce their formal income.
1Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) expressed the optimal tax rates in the Mirrlees model with elasticities. The
higher is the elasticity of labor supply, the lower is the optimal marginal tax rate at this level of income.
2This e↵ect corresponds to what La Porta and Shleifer (2008) call the romantic view on the shadow economy.
In this view, associated with the works of Hernando de Soto (de Soto (1990, 2000)), the informal sector protects
productive firms from harmful regulation and taxes.
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We derive the formula for the optimal tax with a shadow economy. The informal sector imposes an
upper bound on the marginal tax rate, which depends on the distribution of formal and informal
productivities. The optimal tax rate at each formal income level is given by either the usual
Diamond (1998) formula or the upper bound, if the Diamond formula prescribes rates that are
too high. In contrast to the standard Mirrlees (1971) model, in the model with shadow economy
di↵erent types of workers are likely to be bunched at the single level of formal income. Specifically,
all agents that supply shadow labor are subject to bunching. We develop the optimal bunching
condition which complements the Diamond formula.3
The model is calibrated to Colombia, where 58% of workers are employed informally. We derive the
joint distribution of formal and shadow productivity from a household survey. The main di culty
is that most individuals work only in one sector at a time. We infer their productivity in the
other sector by estimating a factor: a linear combination of workers’ and jobs’ characteristics that
explains most of the variability of shadow and formal productivities. The factor allows us to match
similar individuals and infer their missing productivities. When we apply the actual tax schedule
to the calibrated economy, the model replicates well the actual size of the informal sector.
We find that the optimal share of shadow workers in the total workforce is close to 22% under the
Rawlsian planner and less than 1% under the Utilitarian planner. This means that the optimal
shadow economy is much smaller than than 58%, the actual share of shadow workers in Colombia.
In comparison the Colombian income tax at the time, the optimal tax schedule has lower marginal
rates at the bottom and higher rates elsewhere. Lower tax rates at the bottom displace less workers
to the shadow economy, while higher tax rates above raise more revenue from high earners, yielding
large welfare gains. The optimal tax rates are generally lower then the ones implied by the Mirrlees
(1971) model without the informal sector. The application of the Mirrlees (1971) income tax would
displace an excessive number of workers to the shadow economy.
Related literature. Tax evasion has been studied at least since Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
For us, the most relevant paper from this literature is Kopczuk (2001). He shows that tax evasion can
be welfare improving if and only if individuals are heterogeneous with respect to both productivity
and tax evasion ability.4 We explore this result by decomposing the welfare gain from tax evasion
into the e ciency and redistribution components. Furthermore, Kopczuk (2001) derives the optimal
linear income tax with tax evasion. We focus on the optimal non-linear income tax and provide a
sharp characterization of the optimal shadow economy. The impact of income taxes on informal
activity has been studied empirically as well. Fr´ıas, Kumler, and Verhoogen (2013) show that
underreporting of wages decreases, once reported income is linked to pension benefits. Waseem
(2013) documents that an increase of taxes of partnerships in Pakistan led to a massive shift to
other business forms as well as a large spike in income underreporting.
3In the Mirrlees (1971) model without wealth e↵ects the optimal allocation is described by the Diamond formula
if and only if the resulting income schedule is non-decreasing, which is usually verified ex post. If the Diamond
formula implies the income schedule that is decreasing at some type, our optimal bunching condition recovers the
optimum.
4Kopczuk (2001) describes his framework as a model of tax avoidance. In our view his results are applicable also
in studying tax evasion, which is the focus of our paper.
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Our model is focused on the workers’ heterogeneity with respect to formal and informal produc-
tivities. A similar approach was taken by Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2009), who study the
impact of labor market institutions in a model with the formal and informal labor markets and a
search friction. There is a complementary approach to modeling the shadow economy, which focuses
on firms’ rather than workers’ heterogeneity. In Rauch (1991) managers with varying skills decide
in which sector to open a business. He finds that less productive managers choose informal sector
in order to avoid costly regulation. Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2015) consider heterogeneous firms
that decide in which sector to operate and who are randomly matched with homogeneous workers.
They find that policies aimed at reduction of the shadow economy increase competition for workers
in the formal labor market and improve welfare. Amaral and Quintin (2006) to the best of our
knowledge provide the only framework with the shadow economy where heterogeneity of both firms
and workers is present. They extend the Rauch (1991) model by allowing for physical and human
capital accumulation. Due to complementarity between the two types of capital, educated workers
tend to stay in the more capital intensive formal sector.
The following two papers derive the optimal policy in related environments. Gomes, Lozachmeur,
and Pavan (2014) study the optimal sector-specific income taxation when individuals can work in
one of the two sectors of the economy. In our setting there are also two sectors, but the government
can impose tax only on one of them. Moreover, we allow agents to work in the two sectors si-
multaneously. Alvarez-Parra and Sa´nchez (2009) study the optimal unemployment insurance with
the moral hazard in search e↵ort and an informal labor market. It is another environment with
information frictions in which the informal employment is utilized in the optimal allocation.
Structure of the paper. In the next section we use a simple model of two types to show how the
shadow economy can emerge in the optimum and what are the welfare consequences. In Section 3
we derive the optimal tax schedule with a large number of types and general social preferences. In
Section 4 we introduce our methodology of extracting shadow productivities from the micro data
and apply it to Colombia. We derive the optimal Colombian tax schedule in Section 5. The last
section concludes.
2 Simple model
Imagine an economy inhabited by people that share preferences but di↵er in productivity. There
are two types of individuals, indexed by letters L and H, with strictly positive population shares
µL and µH . They all care about consumption c and labor supply n according to the utility function
U (c, n) = c  v (n) . (1)
We assume that v is increasing, strictly convex, twice di↵erentiable and satisfies v0 (0) = 0. The
inverse function of v0 is denoted by g.
There are two labor markets and, correspondingly, each agent is equipped with two linear production
technologies. An agent of type i 2 {L,H} produces with productivity wfi in a formal labor market,
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and with productivity wsi in an informal labor market. Type H is more productive in the formal
market than type L: wfH > w
f
L. Moreover, in this section we assume that each type’s informal
productivity is lower than formal productivity: 8i wfi > wsi . We relax this assumption when we
consider the full model.
Any agent may work formally, informally, or in both markets simultaneously. An agent of type i
works ni hours in total, which is the sum of n
f
i hours at the formal job and n
s
i hours in the shadow
economy. The formal and the informal income, denoted by yfi and y
s
i respectively, is a product of
the relevant productivity and the relevant labor supply. The allocation of resources may involve
transfers across types, so one’s consumption may be di↵erent than the sum of formal and informal
income. In order to capture these flows of resources, we introduce a tax Ti, equal to the gap between
total income and consumption
Ti ⌘ yfi + ysi   ci. (2)
A negative tax is called a transfer, and we are going to use these terms interchangeably.
The social planner follows John Rawls’ theory of justice and wants to improve the well-being of the
least well-o↵ agents,5 but is limited by imperfect knowledge. The planner knows the structure and
parameters of the economy, but, as in the standard Mirrlees model, does not observe the type of any
individual. In addition, shadow income and labor are unobserved by the planner as well. The only
variables at the individual level the planner sees and can directly verify are the formal income yfi
and the tax Ti. We can think about y
f
i and y
f
i   Ti as a pre-tax and an after-tax reported income.
Although shadow labor cannot be controlled directly, it is influenced by the choice of formal labor.
Formal labor a↵ects the marginal disutility from labor and hence changes the agent’s optimal choice
of shadow hours. Two types of labor are related according to the following function, implied by the
agent’s first order condition
nsi
 
nf
 
= max
 
g (wsi )  nf , 0
 
. (3)
When the agent works a su cient number of hours in the formal sector, the marginal disutility
from labor is too high to work additionally in the shadows. However, if the formal hours fall short
of g (wsi ) , the resulting gap is filled with shadow labor.
The planner maximizes the Rawlsian social welfare function, given by a utility level of the worst-o↵
agent
max
{(nfi ,Ti)2R+⇥R}i2{L,H}
min {U (cL, nL) , U (cH , nH)} , (4)
subject to the relation between formal and shadow labor
nsi
 
nf
 
= max
 
g (wsi )  nf , 0
 
, (5)
the accounting equations
8i2{L,H} ci = wfi nfi + wsinsi
⇣
nfi
⌘
  Ti, (6)
5We pick this particular point of the Pareto frontier because it allows us to show the interesting features of the
model with relatively easy derivations. At the end of this section we discuss how other constrained e cient allocations
look like.
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8i2{L,H} ni = nfi + nsi
⇣
nfi
⌘
, (7)
a resource constraint X
i2{L,H}
µiTi   0, (8)
and incentive-compatibility constraints
8i2{L,H} U (ci, ni)   U
 
wf in
f
 i + w
s
in
s
i
 
wf i
wfi
nf i
!
  T i,
wf i
wfi
nf i + n
s
i
 
wf i
wfi
nf i
!!
. (9)
We denote the generic incentive constraint by ICi, i. It means that an agent i cannot be better o↵
by earning the formal income of the other type and simultaneously adjusting informal labor.
2.1 First-best
What if the planner is omniscient and directly observes all variables? The planner knows types and
can choose the shadow labor supply directly. The optimal allocation is a solution to the welfare
maximization problem (4) where planner chooses both formal and shadow labor and a tax of each
type subject only to the accounting equations (6) and (7) and the resource constraint (8). All
types are more productive in the formal sector than in the shadow economy, so no agent will work
informally. Each agent will supply the formal labor e ciently, equalizing the marginal social cost
and benefit of working. Moreover, the planner redistributes income from H to L in order to achieve
the equality of well-being.
Proposition 1. In the first-best both types work only formally and supply an e cient amount of
labor: 8iv0 (ni) = wfi . Utility levels of the two types are equal: U (cL, nL) = U (cH , nH) .
We can slightly restrict the amount of information available to the planner without a↵ecting the op-
timal allocation. Suppose that the planner still observes the formal productivity, but shadow labor
and income are hidden. The optimal allocation is a solution to (4) subject to the relation between
shadow and formal labor (5), the accounting equations (6) and (7) and the resource constraint (8).
Proposition 2. If the planner knows types, but does not observe shadow labor and income, the
planner can achieve the first-best.
When the types are known, the planner can use the lump-sum taxation and implement the first-best.
Without additional frictions, the hidden shadow economy does not constrain the social planner.
2.2 Second-best
Let’s consider the problem in which neither type nor informal activity is observed. The planner
solves (4) subject to all the constraints (5) - (9). We call the solution to this problem the second-best
or simply the optimum.
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Proposition 3. The optimum is not the first-best. ICH,L is binding, while ICL,H is slack.
In the first-best, both types work only on the formal market and their utilities are equal. If H
could mimic the other type, higher formal productivity would allow H to increase utility. Hence,
the first-best does not satisfy ICH,L and this constraint limits the welfare at the optimum. On the
other hand, ICL,H never binds at the optimum. It would require the redistribution of resources
from type L to H, which is clearly suboptimal.
2.2.1 Optimal shadow economy
The standard Mirrlees model typically involves labor distortions, since they can relax the binding
incentive constraints. If type i is tempted to pretend to be of the type  i, distorting number of
hours of  i will discourage the deviation. Agents di↵er in labor productivity, so if i is more (less)
productive than the other type, decreasing (increasing) number of hours worked by  i will make
the deviation less attractive. Proposition 3 tells us that no agent wants to mimic type H, hence
the planner has no reason to distort the labor choice of these agents. Moreover, according to (5)
shadow labor is supplied only if formal labor is su ciently distorted. Hence, the classic result of
no distortions at the top implies here that H will work only formally.
Corollary 1. Type H faces no distortions and never works in the shadow economy.
On the other hand, the planner can improve social welfare by distorting the formal labor supply
of type L. Stronger distortions relax the binding incentive constraint and allow the planner to
redistribute more. If distortions are strong enough, type L will end up supplying shadow labor.
Optimality of doing so depends on whether and by how much increasing shadow labor of type L
relaxes the binding incentive constraint. As Proposition 4 demonstrates, a comparative advantage
of type L in shadow labor plays a crucial role. In the proof we use the optimality condition derived
in the Appendix 2 (see Lemma A.1). In order to make sure that this condition is well behaved, we
require that v00 is nondecreasing.6
Proposition 4. Suppose that v00 is nondecreasing. Type L may optimally work in the shadow
economy only if  
wsL
wfL
  w
s
H
wfH
!
µH   w
f
L   wsL
wfL
µL. (10)
Condition (10) is also a su cient condition for type L to optimally work in the shadow economy if
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL). Otherwise, the su cient (but not necessary) condition is0B@wsL
wfL
 
v0
⇣
wfL
wfH
g (wsL)
⌘
wfH
1CAµH   wfL   wsL
wfL
µL. (11)
Inequality (10) provides a necessary condition for the optimal shadow economy by comparing the
marginal benefit and cost of increasing shadow labor of type L. The left hand side is the comparative
6In the canonical case of isoelastic utility, it means that the elasticity of the labor supply is not greater than 1.
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advantage of type L over type H in the shadow labor, multiplied by the share of type H. This
advantage has to be positive for type L to optimally work in the shadow economy. Otherwise,
increasing shadow labor of this type does not relax the binding incentive constraint. Since the
shadow economy does not facilitate screening of types, there are no benefits from the productivity-
inferior shadow sector. The welfare gains from the relaxed incentive constraint are proportional to
the share of type h, as the planner obtains more resources for redistribution by imposing a higher
tax on this type. On the right hand side, the cost of increasing shadow labor is given by the
productivity loss from using the inferior shadow production, multiplied by the share of types that
supply shadow labor.
Condition (10) is also a su cient condition for type L to work in the shadow economy if the shadow
productivity of type H is not much lower than the shadow productivity of type L. If that is not
the case, the optimality condition derived in Lemma A.1 is not su cient and we have to impose a
stronger su ciency condition (11).
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition on the diagram of the parameter space (wsH , w
s
L). Along the
diagonal no type has the comparative advantage, since ratios of shadow and formal productivity of
the two types are equal. The optimal shadow economy requires that type L has the comparative
advantage in shadow labor, so the interesting action happens above the diagonal. The shadow econ-
omy is never optimal for pairs of shadow productivities which violate inequality (10). Depending
on whether
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) is greater than g(w
s
L), the inequality (10) is also a su cient condition for the
optimal shadow economy, or we use (11) instead. Note that the lower frontier of the necessity region
crosses the vertical axis at the value µLw
f
L. As the proportion of type L decreases toward zero, the
region where shadow economy is optimal increases, in the limit encompassing all the points where
type L has the comparative advantage over H in shadow labor.
We know when type L optimally works in the shadow economy. Proposition 5 tells us, how much
shadow labor should type L supply in this case.
Proposition 5. Suppose that type L optimally works in the shadow economy. Type L works only
in the shadow economy if wsH   wsL. Type L works in both sectors simultaneously if wsH < wsL.
When type L is more productive in the shadows than H and works only in the shadow economy,
then by ICH,L the utility of type L will be greater than the utility of H. Since the planner is
Rawlsian, the utility levels of both types will be equalized by making type L work partly in the
formal economy. On the other hand, when type H is more productive informally, ICH,L means
that the utility of type L will be always lower. Then if the shadow economy benefits type L, the
planner will use it as much as possible.
2.2.2 Shadow economy and welfare
In order to examine the welfare implications of the shadow economy, we compare social welfare of
the two allocations. The first one, noted with a superscript M , is the optimum of the standard
Mirrlees model. We can think about the standard Mirrlees model as a special case of our model, in
which both wsL and w
s
H are equal 0. The second allocation, noted with a superscript
SE , involves
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Figure 1: The optimal shadow economy
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Sufficient condition for the optimal shadow economy
Necessary condition for the optimal shadow economy
type L working only in the shadow economy and the planner transferring resources from type H
to type L up to the point when the incentive constraint ICH,L binds. The allocation SE is not
necessarily the optimum of the shadow economy model. We use it, nevertheless, to illuminate the
channels through which the shadow economy influences social welfare. We measure social welfare
with the utility of type L. The welfare di↵erence between the two allocations can be decomposed
in the following way
U
 
cSEL , n
SE
L
   U  cML , nML  | {z } = U  wsLnSEL , nSEL    U ⇣wfLnML , nML ⌘| {z } + TML   TSEL| {z } .
total welfare gain e ciency gain redistribution gain
(12)
The e ciency gain measures the di↵erence in distortions imposed on type L, while the redistribu-
tion gain describes the change in the level of transfer type L receives. Thanks to the quasilinear
preferences, we can decompose these two e↵ects additively.
E ciency gain. The distortion imposed on type L in the shadow economy arise from the pro-
ductivity loss wfL wsL. By varying wsL, this distortion can be made arbitrarily small. On the other
hand, the distortion of the standard Mirrlees model is implied by the marginal tax rate on formal
income. Given redistributive social preferences, it is always optimal to impose a positive tax rate
on type l. The e ciency gain, which captures the di↵erence in distortions between two regimes, is
strictly increasing in wsL. Intuitively, the positive e ciency gain means that the shadow economy
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raises social welfare by sheltering the workers from tax distortions.
Redistribution gain. The shadow economy improves redistribution if the planner is able to give
higher transfer to type L (or equivalently raise higher tax from type H). The di↵erence in transfers
can be expressed as
TML   TSEL = µH
 
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U  wsHnSEH , nSEH  
!
. (13)
What determines the magnitude of redistribution is the possibility of production of type H after
misreporting. In the standard Mirrlees model deviating type H uses formal productivity and can
produce only as much output as type l. In the allocation where type L works only informally, type
H cannot supply any formal labor, but is unconstrained in supplying informal labor. Hence, the
redistribution gain is strictly decreasing in wsH . Intuitively, a positive redistribution gain means
that the shadow economy is used as a screening device, helping the planner to tell the types apart.
Proposition 6 uses the decomposition into the e ciency and redistribution gains in order to derive
threshold values for shadow productivity of each type. Depending on which side of the thresholds
the productivities are, the existence of the shadow economy improves or deteriorates social welfare
in comparison to the standard Mirrlees model.
Proposition 6. Define an increasing function H (ws) = U (wsg (ws) , g (ws)) and the following
threshold values
w¯sL = H
 1
⇣
U
⇣
wfLn
M
L , n
M
L
⌘⌘
2
⇣
0, wfL
⌘
, w¯sH = H
 1
⇣
U
⇣
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
⌘⌘
2
⇣
0, wfH
⌘
.
(14)
If wsL   w¯sL and wsH  w¯sH , where at least one of these inequalities is strict, the existence of the
shadow economy improves welfare in comparison to the standard Mirrlees model.
If wsL  w¯sL and wsH   w¯sH , where at least one of these inequalities is strict, the existence of the
shadow economy deteriorates welfare in comparison to the standard Mirrlees model.
The proposition is illustrated on the Figure 2. When the shadow productivity of type L is above
w¯sL, the e ciency gain is positive. When the shadow productivity of type H is above w¯
s
H , the
redistribution gain is negative. Obviously, when both gains are positive (negative), the shadow
economy benefits (hurts) welfare. However, the shadow economy does not have to strengthen both
redistribution and e ciency simultaneously to be welfare improving. Particularly interesting is the
region where the redistribution gain is negative, but the e ciency gain is su ciently high such that
the welfare is higher with the shadow economy. In this case the optimum of the shadow economy
model Pareto dominates the optimum of the Mirrlees model. Type L gains, since the welfare is
higher with the shadow economy. Type H benefits as well, as the negative redistribution gain
implies a lower tax of this type.
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Figure 2: Shadow economy and welfare
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2.2.3 General social preferences
In this short section we will derive some properties of the whole Pareto frontier of the two-types
model. We consider the planner that maximizes the general utilitarian social welfare function
 LµLU (cL, nL) +  HµHU (cH , nH) , (15)
where the two Pareto weights are non-negative and sum up to 1. The maximization is subject to
the constraints (5) - (9).
From the Rawlsian case we know that the comparative advantage of type L in shadow labor is
necessary for this type to work in the shadows. Proposition 7 generalizes this observation.
Proposition 7. Type i 2 {L,H} may optimally work in the shadow economy only if wsi
wfi
>
ws i
wf i
and  i >   i.
In order to optimally work in the shadow economy, any type i 2 {L,H} has to satisfy two re-
quirements. First, type i needs to have the comparative advantage in the shadow labor over the
other type. Otherwise, shifting labor from formal to shadow sector does not relax the incentive
constraints. Second, the planner has to be willing to redistribute resources to type i - the Pareto
weight of this type has to be greater than the weight of the other type. The shadow economy can
be beneficial only when it relaxes the binding incentive constraints, and the incentive constraint
11
IC i,i binds if  i >   i. Intuitively, if the planner prefers to tax rather than support some agents,
it is suboptimal to let them evade taxation.
When will type i optimally work in the shadow economy? Let’s compare the welfare of two allo-
cations. In the first allocation (denoted by superscript SE) type i works exclusively in the shadow
economy. It provides the lower bound on welfare when type i is employed informally. The second
allocation (denoted by M ) is the optimum of the standard Mirrlees model, or equivalently the op-
timum of the shadow economy model where wsi = w
s i = 0. It is the upper bound on welfare when
type i is employed only in the formal sector. We can decompose the welfare di↵erence between
these two allocations in the familiar way
WSE  WM| {z } = µi i ⇣U  wsinSEi , nSEi    U ⇣wfi nMi , nMi ⌘⌘| {z } + µi ( i     i)  TMi   TSEi  | {z } .
total welfare gain e ciency gain redistribution gain
(16)
The welfare di↵erence can be decomposed into the di↵erence in e↵ective distortions imposed on
type i and the di↵erence in transfers received by this type. The only essential change in comparison
to the simpler Rawlsian case given by (12) comes from the Pareto weights. The more the planner
cares about type  i, the less valuable are gains in redistribution in comparison to the gains in
e ciency.
Proposition 8. Suppose that  i >   i for some i 2 {L,H}. Define the following thresholds
w¯si = H 1
⇣
U
⇣
wfi n
M
i , n
M
i
⌘⌘
2
⇣
0, wfi
⌘
, w¯s i = H 1
✓
U
✓
wfi n
M
i ,
wfi
wf i
nMi
◆◆
2
⇣
0, wf i
⌘
.
(17)
If wsi   w¯si and ws i  w¯s i, where at least one of these inequalities is strict, then type i optimally
works in the shadow economy and the optimum welfare is strictly higher than in the standard
Mirrlees model.
Proposition 8 generalizes the thresholds from Proposition 6. Interestingly, when the planner cares
more about the more productive formally type H, these agents may end up working in the shadow
economy. It may be surprising, since in the standard Mirrlees model the formal labor supply of this
type is optimally either undistorted, or distorted upwards, while supplying shadow labor requires a
downwards distortion. Nevertheless, if shadow economy magnifies productivity di↵erences between
types, it may be in the best interest of type H to supply only informal labor and enjoy higher
transfer financed by the other type. The shadow economy in such allocation works as a tax haven,
accessible only to the privileged.
3 Full model
In this section we describe the optimal tax schedule in the economy with a large number of types.
Below we introduce a general taxation problem. Then we examine the requirements of incentive
compatibility, which will involve the standard monotonicity condition. We proceed to characterize
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the optimal income tax. First we derive optimality conditions (which we call the interior optimality
conditions) under the assumption that the monotonicity condition holds. It is a common practice
in the literature on Mirrleesian taxation to stop here and verify the monotonicity numerically ex
post. It is justified, since in the standard Mirrlees model the violation of the monotonicity requires
rather unusual assumptions. On the other hand, the shadow economy provides an environment
where the monotonicity condition is much more likely to be violated. We discuss in detail why it
is the case and carry on to the optimality conditions when the monotonicity constraint is binding.
The optimal allocation in this case involves bunching, i.e. some types are pooled together at the
kinks of the tax schedule. We derive the optimal bunching condition with an intuitive variational
method.7 In the last subsection we summarize the main results from the full model.
3.1 The planner’s problem
Workers are distributed on the type interval [0, 1] according to a density µi and a cumulative density
Mi. The density µi is atomless. We assume that formal and informal productivities (w
f
i and w
s
i )
are di↵erentiable with respect to type and denote these derivatives by w˙fi and w˙
s
i . It will be useful
to denote the growth rates of productivities by ⇢xi =
w˙xi
wxi
, x 2 {f, s} . Types are sorted such that
the formal productivity is increasing: w˙fi > 0. We will use the dot notation to write derivatives
with respect to type of other variables as well. For instance, y˙fi stands for the derivative of formal
income with respect to type, evaluated at some type i.
We focus on preferences without wealth e↵ects. Agents’ utility function is U (c, n) = c v (n) , where
v is increasing, strictly convex and twice di↵erentiable function. We denote the inverse function of
the marginal disutility from labor v0 by g and the elasticity of labor supply of type i by ⇣i.8 Let
Vi
 
yf , T
 
be the indirect utility function of an agent of type i whose reported formal income is yf
and who pays a tax T :
Vi
 
yf , T
  ⌘ max
ns 0
yf + wsin
s   T   v
 
yf
wfi
+ ns
!
. (18)
In addition to earning the formal income, the agent is optimally choosing the amount of informal
labor. Due to concavity of the problem, the choice of ns is pinned down by the familiar first order
condition, modified to allow for the corner solution
min
(
v0
 
yf
wfi
+ ns
!
  wsi , nsi
)
= 0. (19)
Whenever the formal income yf is su ciently high, no shadow labor is supplied. Conversely,
su ciently low formal income leads to informal employment.
7Ebert (1992) relies on the optimal control theory to derive the optimal tax when the monotonicity condition is
binding. We use the more transparent variational method and develop the optimal bunching condition in the spirit
of the Diamond (1998) tax formula.
8Since we abstract from wealth e↵ects, the compensated and uncompensated elasticities coincide. Note that the
elasticity is in general an endogenous object, as it depends on labor supply: ⇣i =
v0(ni)
niv00(ni) .
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The planner chooses a formal income schedule yf and a tax schedule T in order to maximize a
general social welfare function
max
(yfi ,Ti)i2[0,1]
ˆ 1
0
 iG
⇣
Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘⌘
dµi, (20)
whereG is an increasing and di↵erentiable function and the Pareto weights   2 [0, 1]! R+ integrate
to 1.9 The budget constraint is the following
ˆ 1
0
Tidµi   E, (21)
where the net tax revenue needs to cover some fixed expenditures E. Moreover, the tax schedule
has to satisfy incentive compatibility
8i,j2[0,1]Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
  Vi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘
, (22)
which means that no agent can gain by mimicking any other type. The allocation which solves (20)
subject to (21) and (22) is called the second-best or the optimum.
We will describe the optimum by specifying the marginal tax rate of each type. The marginal tax
rate is given by the ratio of slopes of the total tax schedule and the formal income schedule
ti =
T˙i
y˙fi
. (23)
Intuitively, it describes the fraction of a marginal formal income increase that is claimed by the
planner.
3.2 Incentive-compatibility
The single crossing property allows the planner in the standard Mirrlees model to focus only on local
incentive compatibility constraints. Intuitively, the single-crossing means that, given a constant tax
rate, a higher type is willing to earn more than a lower type. The single-crossing in our model
means that, holding the tax rate constant, the higher type is willing to earn formally more than
the lower type.
Assumption 1. A comparative advantage in shadow labor is decreasing with type: ddi
⇣
wsi
wfi
⌘
< 0.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the indirect utility function V has the single crossing property.
The single-crossing holds when the agents with lower formal productivity have a comparative ad-
vantage in working in the informal sector. The single-crossing allows us to replace the general
incentive compatibility condition (22) with two simpler requirements.
9It’s easy to relax the assumption of a finite Pareto weight on each type and we are going to do it in the quantitative
section, where we consider, among others, the Rawlsian planner.
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Proposition 9. Under Assumption 1, the allocation
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
i2[0,1]
is incentive-compatible if and
only if the two conditions are satisfied:
1. yfi is non-decreasing in type.
2. If y˙fi exists, then the local incentive-compatibility condition holds:
d
djVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
= 0.
The utility schedule Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
of an incentive compatible allocation is continuous everywhere, dif-
ferentiable almost everywhere and for any i < 1 can be expressed as
Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
= V0
⇣
yf0 , T0
⌘
+
ˆ i
0
V˙j
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘
dj, (24)
where
V˙j
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘
⌘
⇣
⇢fj n
f
j + ⇢
s
jn
s
j
⌘
v0 (nj) . (25)
The single crossing implies that for any tax schedule the level of formal income chosen by a worker
is weakly increasing in the worker’s type. Hence, assigning a lower income to a higher type would
violate incentive compatibility. It is enough to focus just on local deviations: no agent should be able
to improve utility by marginally changing the formal earnings. This local incentive-compatibility
constraint is equivalent to the familiar condition for the optimal choice of the formal income given
the marginal tax rate ti, allowing for the corner solution
min
(
v0
 
yfi
wfi
+ nsi
!
  (1  ti)wfi , yfi
)
= 0. (26)
Note that the formal income may be, and sometimes will be, discontinuous in type. Nevertheless,
the indirect utility function preserves some smoothness and can be expressed as an integral of its
marginal increments.
Let’s call V˙i
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
the marginal information rent of type i. It describes how the utility level
changes with type. The higher the average rate of productivity growth, weighted by the labor
inputs in two sectors, the faster utility increases with type. We will use perturbations in the
marginal information rent to derive the optimal tax schedule.
In what follows we will economize on notation of the utility schedule and its slope by supressing
the arguments: Vi ⌘ Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
and V˙i ⌘ V˙i
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
.
3.3 Optimality conditions
First, we solve for the optimum under assumption that the resulting formal income schedule is
non-decreasing. Second, we examine when this assumption is justified and show that the existence
of the shadow economy make it’s violation more likely. Finally, we derive the optimality conditions
in the general case.
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Figure 3: Decreasing the marginal information rent of type i
3.3.1 Interior optimality conditions
We obtain the interior optimality conditions by making sure that the social welfare cannot be
improved by perturbing the marginal information rent of any type.10 A marginal information rent
is a slope of the utility schedule at some type i. It can be reduced by increasing tax distortions
of this type, which is costly for the budget. On the other hand, by (24) such perturbation shifts
downwards the entire utility schedule above type i (see Figure 3). This shift is a uniform increase of
a non-distortionary tax of all types above i. The interior optimality conditions balance the cost of
distortions with gains from e cient taxation for each type. Below we present terms that capture the
marginal costs and benefits of such perturbations. We derive them in detail in the proof of Theorem
1. The shadow economy enters the picture by a↵ecting the cost of increasing tax distortions.
The benefit of shifting the utility schedule of type j without a↵ecting its slope is given by the
standard expression
Nj ⌘ (1  !j)µj , where !j =  j
⌘
G0 (Vj) . (27)
A marginal increase of non-distortionary taxation of type j leads to one-to-one increase of tax
revenue. On the other hand, it reduces the social welfare, since the utility of type j falls. Following
Piketty and Saez (2013) we call this welfare impact the marginal welfare weight and denote it by
!j . Note that welfare impact is normalized by the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint ⌘.
It allows us to express changes in welfare in the unit of resources. We multiply the whole expression
by the density of type j in order to include all agents of this type. We assumed that there are no
10To the best of our knowledge, Brendon (2013) was the first to use this approach in the Mirrlees model. He also
inspired us to express the optimality conditions with endogenous cost terms, although our notation di↵ers from his.
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wealth e↵ects, so the non-distortionary tax does not a↵ect the labor choice of agents. Consequently,
the term Nj does not depend on whether type j works informally.
The cost of decreasing some agent’s marginal information rent depends on the involvement of this
agent in the shadow activity. Types can be grouped into three sets:
formal workers: F ⌘
n
i 2 [0, 1] : v0
⇣
nfi
⌘
> wsi
o
,
marginal workers: M ⌘
n
i 2 [0, 1] : v0
⇣
nfi
⌘
= wsi
o
,
shadow workers: S ⌘
n
i 2 [0, 1] : v0
⇣
nfi
⌘
< wsi
o
.
The formal workers supply only formal labor: their marginal disutility from working is strictly
greater than their shadow productivity. The marginal workers also supply only formal labor, but
their marginal disutility from work is exactly equal to their shadow productivity. A small reduction
of formal labor supply of these agents would make them work in the informal sector. Finally, the
shadow workers are employed informally, although they can also supply some formal labor.
The formal workers act exactly like agents in the standard Mirrlees model. By increasing distortions,
the planner is reducing their total labor supply. The cost of increasing distortions is given by
Dfi ⌘
ti
1  ti
✓
⇢fi
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆◆ 1
µi. (28)
The cost depends positively on the marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate tell us how strongly
a reduction of the formal income influences the tax revenue. Moreover, the cost increases with
the elasticity of labor supply ⇣i and is proportional to the density of the distorted type. D
f
i is
endogenous, as it depends on the marginal tax rate.
The perturbation of the marginal information rent works di↵erently for the shadow workers. They
supply shadow labor in the quantity that satisfies v0
⇣
nfi + n
s
i
⌘
= wsi , which means that their total
labor supply ni is constant. By distorting the formal income, the planner simply shift their labor
from the formal to the informal sector. As a result, the cost of increasing distortions does not
depend on the elasticity of labor supply, but rather on the sectoral productivity di↵erences,
Dsi ⌘
wfi   wsi
wsi
⇣
⇢fi   ⇢si
⌘ 1
µi. (29)
The first term is the relative productivity di↵erence between formal and informal sector. Actually,
it’s also equal to ti1 ti , since the marginal tax rate of these types equalizes the return to labor in
both sectors: (1  ti)wfi = wsi . Hence, as in the case of formal workers, the first term corresponds
to the direct tax revenue cost of reduced formal labor supply. The second term describes how
e↵ectively the planner can manipulate the agent’s marginal information rent by discouraging the
formal labor. By the single-crossing assumption, this term is always positive. Again, the density µi
aggregates the expression to include all agents of type i. Note that Dsi is exogenous, as it depends
only on the fundamentals of the economy.
The marginal workers are walking a tightrope between their formal and shadow colleagues. If the
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planner marginally reduces their income, they become the shadow workers. If the planner lifts
distortions, they join the formal workers. The cost of changing distortions of these types depends
on the direction of perturbation and is equal to either Dfi or D
s
i .
Having all the cost and benefit terms ready, we can derive the interior optimality conditions. Recall,
that by varying the distortions imposed on some type, the planner changes a non-distortionary
tax of all types above. In the optimum, the planner cannot increase the social welfare by such
perturbations. For the formal workers, this means that
8i2F Dfi =
ˆ 1
i
Njdj. (30)
It is a standard optimality condition from the Mirrlees model, derived first in the quasilinear case
by Diamond (1998). The shadow economy does not a↵ect the marginal tax rate of formal agents
directly. It may influence them only indirectly, by changing the marginal welfare weights of types
above.
For the marginal workers it must be the case that increasing tax distortions is beneficial as long as
they work only formally, but it is too costly when they start to supply the shadow labor.
8i2M Dsi  
ˆ 1
i
Njdj   Dfi and yfi = wfi g (wsi ) . (31)
The marginal workers do not supply informal labor, but in their case the shadow economy con-
stitutes a binding constraint for the planner. Absent the shadow economy, the marginal tax rates
would be set at a higher level. In our model the planner is not willing to do it, because it would push
the marginal workers to informal jobs, which is too costly. Formal labor supply of the marginal
workers is fixed at the lowest level that leaves them no incentives to work informally.
Recall that the cost of distorting the shadow worker is fixed by the parameters of the economy.
Moreover, the benefit of distorting one particular worker, given by (27), is fixed as well, since the
perturbation of the marginal information rent of i has an infinitesimal e↵ect on the utility of types
above. If the planner finds it optimal to decrease the formal income of agent i so much that i starts
supplying informal labor, it will be optimal to decrease the formal income all the way to zero, when
i works only in the shadow economy:
8i2S
ˆ 1
i
Njdj > D
s
i and y
f
i = 0. (32)
Note that according to this condition all shadow workers are bunched together at zero formal
income.11
11Notice that we could replace the strict inequality with a weak one in (32), and conversely regarding the left
inequality in (31). In words, when the cost of distorting some marginal worker is exactly equal to the benefit, then
this worker could equally well be a shadow worker, with no change in the social welfare. It means that whenever the
curves Dsi and
´ 1
i Njdj cross, the optimum is not unique, since we could vary allocation of the type at the intersection.
Since such a crossing is unlikely to happen more than a few times, we do not consider this as an important issue.
We sidestep it by assuming that the planner introduces distortions only when there are strictly positive gains from
doing so. Consequently, our notion of uniqueness of optimum should be understood with this reservation.
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The optimality conditions (30)-(32) determine the slope of the utility schedule at each type. What
is left is finding the optimal level. Suppose that the planner varies the tax paid by the lowest
type, while keeping all the marginal rates fixed. Optimum requires that such perturbation cannot
improve welfare: ˆ 1
0
Njdj = 0. (33)
Definition. The conditions (30)-(33) are called the interior optimality conditions. The allocation 
yf , T
 
consistent with the interior optimality conditions is called the interior allocation. Specifi-
cally, yf is called the interior formal income schedule.
The interior conditions are necessary for the optimum as long as they don’t imply a formal income
schedule which is locally decreasing. They become su cient, if they pin down a unique allocation.
This happens when the cost of distortions is increasing in the amount of distortions imposed.
When that is the case, the planner’s problem with respect to each type becomes concave. Theorem
1 provides regularity conditions which guarantee it.
Assumption 2. (i) The elasticity of labor supply v
0(n)
nv00(n) is non-increasing in n. (ii) The ratio of
sectoral growth rates is bounded below 8i ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
>  ⇣ 1i .
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, if all interior formal income schedules are non-decreasing, the
interior optimality conditions are necessary for the optimum. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there is
a unique interior formal income schedule. If it is non-decreasing, the interior optimality conditions
are both necessary and su cient for the optimum.
3.3.2 When do the interior conditions fail?
The interior allocation is incentive-compatible and optimal if it leads to formal income that is non-
decreasing in type. In the standard Mirrlees model formal income is decreasing if the marginal tax
rate increases too quickly with type. However, in virtually all applications of the standard Mirrlees
model this is not a problem, as the conditions under which the interior tax rate increases that fast
are rather unusual.12 The shadow economy gives rise to another reason for non-monotone interior
formal income. In the interior allocation all shadow workers have zero formal income. Hence, if
there is any worker with positive formal income with a type lower than some shadow worker, the
formal income schedule will be locally decreasing. It turns out that this second reason makes the
failure of the interior allocation much more likely. In Proposition 10 below we provide the su cient
conditions for the formal income to be non-decreasing. Then we discuss the two cases in which the
shadow economy leads to the failure of the interior optimality conditions.
Assumption 3. (i) The social welfare function is such that G (V ) = V,  i is non-decreasing in
type for i > 0. (ii) The ratio 1
⇢fi
µi
1 Mi is non-decreasing in type. (iii) The elasticity of labor supply
is constant: 8i⇣i = ⇣. (iv) The ratio of sectoral growth rates ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
is non-decreasing in type.
12Probably simplest way to construct an example of locally decreasing formal income schedule is to assume a
bimodal productivity distribution, with very low density between the modes.
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Proposition 10. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the unique interior formal income schedule is
non-decreasing.
First, notice that we make sure that the interior formal income schedule is unique (Assumption
2). Simultaneously, it implies that the formal income of the marginal workers is non-decreasing.
Assumptions 3(i) - 3(iii) make sure that the marginal tax rate of formal workers is non-increasing
in type, which in turn implies that the formal income of these workers is non-decreasing. These
conditions are familiar from the standard Mirrlees model. Assumption 3(i) is satisfied by the
utilitarian or Rawlsian social welfare function, while Assumption 3(ii) is a weaker counterpart of
the usual monotone hazard ratio requirement.13
Finally, we have to make sure that all shadow workers, if there are any, are at the bottom of the type
space. By (32) it means that the marginal cost of distorting the shadow worker Dsi can cross the
marginal benefit
´ 1
i Njdj at most once and from below. It is guaranteed jointly by conditions 3(i),
3(ii) and the new requirement 3(iv) which says that the ratio of sectoral productivity growth rates
is non-decreasing. In addition to assuring the optimality of the interior allocation, Assumption 3
imply also that sets S,M and F , if non-empty, can be ordered: the bottom types are the shadow
workers, above them are the marginal workers, and the top types are formal.
Assumption 2 makes sure that the Dsi curve crosses the
´ 1
i Njdj curve at most once. Let’s see how
the relaxation of some of its elements make these curves cross more than once. In Example 1 we
relax the assumpion on the social welfare function and in Example 2 we allow the non-monotone
ratio of sectoral growth rates.
Example 1. (i) The social welfare function is such that G (V ) = V, the Pareto weights  i are
continuous in type and satisfy  0 > 2. (ii) The distribution of types is uniform. (iii) The elasticity
of labor supply is constant: 8i⇣i = ⇣ and v0 (0) = 0. (iv) The ratio of sectoral growth rates ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
is
fixed. (v) Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
Lemma 2. In Example 1 there is a threshold w¯s0 2
⇣
0, wf0
⌘
such that if wf0 > w
s
0 > w¯
s
0 the interior
formal income schedule is not non-decreasing.
Example 1 violates Assumption 3 (i), which allows the
´ 1
i Njdj term to be initially increasing in
type.14 Both terms Dsi and
´ 1
i Njdj are increasing at 0, but
´ 1
i Njdj term increases faster. If
wf0 > w
s
0, then the distortion cost at type 0 is greater than the benefit and the bottom type works
formally. If the gap between wf0 and w
s
0 is su ciently small (smaller than w
f
0   w¯s0 > 0), Dsi curve
will cross the benefit curve at some positive type (see Figure 4). Consequently, the agents above
the intersection will work in the shadow economy. Since these agents have no formal income, the
formal income schedule is locally decreasing.
13We can express the distribution of types as a function of formal productivity rather than type. Then the
density is µ¯
⇣
wfi
⌘
= µi
w˙fi
and cumulative density is M¯
⇣
wfi
⌘
=Mi. Hence, assumption 3(ii) means that
wf µ¯
⇣
wf
⌘
1 M¯(wf ) is
non-decreasing. For instance, any Pareto distribution of formal productivity satisfies this assumption.
14The Pareto weights integrate to 1 over the type space, so they have to be lower than or equal to 1 for some types
above 0. Since these weights are continuous and  0 > 2, they will be decreasing for some type above 0, violating
3(i).
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Figure 4: A failure of the interior allocation due to increasing benefit of distortions
´ 1
i Njdj (Ex-
ample 1).
(a) (b)
Figure 5: A failure of the interior allocation due to non-monotone ratio of productivity growth
rates (Example 2).
(a) (b)
Example 2. (i) The social welfare function is Rawlsian: 8i>0 i = 0. (ii) The distribution of types
is uniform. (iii) The elasticity of labor supply is constant: 8i⇣i = ⇣. (iv) The growth rate of formal
productivity is fixed, while the growth rate of shadow productivity is decreasing for some types.
(v) Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
Example 2 satisfies all the requirements of Proposition 10 apart from the non-decreasing sectoral
growth rates ratio assumption. In panel (a) of Figure 5 we can see that the growth rate of shadow
productivity decreases around the middle type and then bounces back. It is reflected in the marginal
cost of distorting shadow workers Dsi (panel (b)). We chose the parameters such that the fall is
substantial, making the Dsi curve cross the
´ 1
i Njdj curve three times. Consequently, the formal
income first increases, then decreases to 0 once the Dsi crosses
´ 1
i Njdj for the second time. This
example shows that even minor irregularities in the distribution of productivities can make the
interior allocation not implementable.
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Figure 6: Ironing the formal income schedule
3.3.3 Optimal bunching
Whenever the interior formal income schedule is decreasing for some types, the interior allocation is
not incentive-compatible and hence is not optimal. Ebert (1992) and Boadway, Cu↵, and Marchand
(2000) applied the optimal control theory to overcome this problem. In contrast to these papers,
we derive the optimal bunching condition with the intuitive variational argument and express it
in the spirit of the Diamond (1998) optimal tax formula. What we are going to do is essentially
“ironing” the formal income schedule whenever it is locally decreasing (see Figure 6). The ironing
was originally introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978) in a solution to the monopolistic pricing
problem when the monotonicity condition is binding.
Suppose that the interior formal income schedule y¯f is decreasing on some set of types, beginning
with a¯. Decreasing formal income is incompatible with the incentive-compatibility. We can regain
incentive-compatibility by lifting the schedule such that it becomes overall non-decreasing and flat in
the interval
⇥
a¯, b¯
⇤
(see Figure 6). Since types
⇥
a¯, b¯
⇤
have the same formal income, they are bunched
and cannot be di↵erentiated by the planner. Such bunching is implemented by a discontinuous
jump of the marginal tax rate.
The flattened schedule is incentive-compatible. However, generally it is not optimal. By marginally
decreasing formal income of type a¯ the planner relaxes the binding monotonicity constraint and can
marginally decrease the formal income of all types in the interval
 
a¯, b¯
 
. This perturbation closes
the gap between the actual formal income and its interior value for the positive measure of types.
On the other hand, the cost of perturbation is infinitesimal: it is a distortion of one type a¯. This
perturbation is clearly welfare-improving, starting from the flattened interior schedule. Below we
find the optimal bunching condition by making sure that the perturbation is not beneficial at the
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optimal income schedule.
Suppose that an interval of agents [a, b] is bunched. Let’s marginally decrease the formal income
of agents [a, b) and adjust their total tax paid such that the utility of type a is unchanged. In this
way we preserve the continuity of the utility schedule. However, since the other bunched agents
have a di↵erent marginal rate of substitution between consumption and income, this perturbation
will decrease their utility. We normalize the perturbation such that we obtain a unit change of the
utility of the highest type in the bunch. The total cost of this perturbation is given by
Da,b ⌘ (ta + E { MRSi!i| b > i   a}) Mb  Ma
tb+   ta  , (34)
where  MRSi =
v0 (na)
wfa
  v
0 (ni)
wfi
.
The expression within the brackets is an average impact of a unit perturbation of the formal income.
The brackets contain two components: a fiscal and a welfare loss. The fiscal loss from reducing the
formal income of each bunched agent is the marginal tax rate below the kink. The welfare loss is
an average marginal welfare weight in the bunch corrected by a discrepancy of the marginal rate
of substitution of a given type from type a. The larger  MRSj is, the more type j su↵ers from
the perturbation. Note that  MRSb is just equal tb+   ta  .15 Hence, in order to normalize the
perturbation to have a unit impact on utility of type b, we divide the brackets by tb+   ta  . We
aggregate this average e↵ect by multiplying it by the mass of bunched types.
The benefit of this perturbation comes from the reduced utility of types above b and is the same
as in the interior case. The optimality requires that
min
⇢ˆ 1
b
Njdj  Da,b, yfa
 
= 0. (35)
Note that the optimality condition involves a corner solution when yfa = 0. It corresponds to the
situation in which the bunched workers don’t work formally at all.
The optimality condition (35) is influenced by the shadow economy again through the cost of
distortion. If some worker i in the bunch [a, b) supplies shadow labor, then the di↵erence in the
marginal rate of substitution for this worker is given by  MRSi =
v0(na)
wfa
  wsi
wfi
.
Theorem 2 combines all the optimality conditions.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, the optimal allocation satisfies (33) and at each level of formal
income one of the three mutually exclusive alternatives hold:
• there is no type that reports such formal income,
• there is a unique type whose allocation satisfies the interior optimality conditions (30)-(32),
• there is a bunch of types whose allocation satisfy the optimal bunching condition (35).
15The marginal tax rate discontinuously increases at the kink. By ta  we denote the tax rate below the kink and
by tb+ the tax rate above the kink.
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Although we managed to characterize the full set of optimality conditions, the interior conditions are
generally easier to use. Below we show that the interior allocation, even if not incentive-compatible,
are a good predictor of which agents optimally work in the shadow economy.
Assumption 4. (i) G is a concave function. (ii) ⇢fi , ⇢
s
i , µi and  i are continuous in type.
Proposition 11. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4, all the types that supply shadow labor in the
interior allocation remain the shadow workers in the optimum.
3.4 Summary of results
Which agents should work in the shadow economy?
Corollary 2. Suppose that v0 (0) = 0. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 type i optimally works in
the shadow economy if
E {1  !j | j > i}   w
f
i   wsi
wfi
 
  d
di
 
wsi
wfi
!! 1
µi
1 Mi . (36)
This condition is both necessary and su cient if the interior allocation is incentive-compatible.
The inequality (36) compares the gains from e cient taxation of all types above i with the cost of
distorting type i, when this type is at the edge of joining the shadow economy. A type i is likely
to optimally work in the shadow economy if the planner on average puts a low marginal welfare
weights on the types above i, the relative productivity loss from moving to informal employment is
low and the density of distorted types is low in comparison to the fraction of types above. Finally,
the shadow employment is more likely if the comparative advantage of working in the shadow sector
wsi
wfi
is quickly decreasing with type. It means that higher types have less incentives to follow type i
into the shadow economy. We assume v0 (0) = 0 so that we do not have to worry about some types
not supplying any labor at all.
Note that with the Rawlsian planner the inequality (36) is just a continuous equivalent of the
condition (10) from the simple model.
The optimal tax rates. Let’s focus on agents that supply some formal labor and are not bunched
at the kinks of the tax schedule. These types never supply informal labor. The optimal tax formula
is
ti
1  ti = min
(
wfi   wsi
wsi
, ⇢fi
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆
1 M i
µi
E (1  !j | j > i)
)
. (37)
The shadow economy imposes an upper bound on the marginal tax rate. The bound (the left term
in the min operator of (37)) is such that the tax rate equalizes the return from formal and informal
labor - it is the highest tax rate consistent with agents working in the formal sector.
If the bound is not constraining the planner, then the tax rate should be set according to Diamond
(1998) formula (the right term in the min operator of (37)). The expectations describe the average
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social preferences towards all types above i. In general, the less the planner cares about increasing
utility of the types above i, the higher ti will be. If the Pareto weights increase with type or G is
a strictly convex function, this term may become negative, leading to negative marginal tax rates,
as explained by Chone´ and Laroque (2010). Since the sign of the tax rate is ambiguous, below we
describe how the other terms influence its absolute value. The optimal tax rate increases in absolute
value when the growth rate of formal productivity with respect to type is high. If the planner is
redistributive and types above i are much more productive than types below, it is optimal to set
a high tax rate. The tax rate decreases with elasticity of labor supply ⇣i, as it makes workers
more responsive to the tax changes. The ratio 1 Miµi tells us how many agents will be taxed in a
non-distortionary manner relative to the density of distorted agents. If this ratio is high, the gain
from increasing tax rates relative to the cost will be high as well.
Optimal bunching. Bunching may arise at the bottom of the formal income distribution, re-
sulting in de facto exclusion from the formal labor market. Bunching may also appear at a positive
level of formal income, which implies a kink in a tax schedule. All workers who supply shadow labor
are subject to bunching, though not necessarily at the same tax kink. Some workers supplying only
formal labor can be found at the kinks as well. The formal income schedule at which the kink is
located is determined by
ta 
tb+   ta  =
1 Mb
Mb  MaE {1  !j | j   b}  E
⇢
 MRSi
 MRSb
wi
     b > i   a  , (38)
where a and b are respectively the lowest and the highest type bunched at the kink. Note that both
ta  and tb+ , the tax rates below and above the kink, are set according to (37). The location of the
kink is determined by the trade-o↵ between tax and welfare losses from the bunched agents and
the tax revenue gains from the e cient taxation of agents above the kink.
4 Measuring shadow and formal productivities
To assess the practical relevance of our theoretical results we proceed to look at the empirical
counterparts of the building blocks of our theory. We focus on a developing economy with a large
shadow sector: Colombia.16 In this section we empirically estimate the three key objects of the
model: the formal productivity (wfi ), the informal productivity (w
s
i ) and the distribution of types
(µi). In section 5 we use our estimates to analyze how the existence of the shadow economy shapes
the optimal tax scheme in Colombia.
Colombia is a case that suits itself very well to take our theory to the data, because the shadow
economy is large and we can actually observe the total income of individuals, both if formal or
shadow, through survey data. Household surveys reveal information about shadow income without
making it usable by the authorities to levy taxes.17 Furthermore, Colombian regulation makes it
1658% of the workers are part of the shadow economy according to our estimates.
17Households are explicitly guaranteed that their answers have no legal implications and cannot be used against
them by any government agency.
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easy to infer shadow and formal income from questions about total income, and from the type of
a liation of the worker to the social security system.
In the model, wfi and w
s
i correspond to the pre-tax (real) income for one unit of labour for individ-
ual of type i in each sector, and µi is the density of such type. Therefore, we have one-dimensional
heterogeneity across individuals. Our empirical strategy is to replicate such one-dimensional het-
erogeneity by using a factor that comprises information of the worker and job characteristics, such
as the education level and the task done on the job. The identification assumptions is that the
pre-tax hourly wage recorded on the surveys is a noisy signal of the productivities in each sector
and that the productivites themselves are a linear function of the factor we employ.
The weights that are used to construct the factor and the parameters that map productivities to
wages are jointly estimated to maximize the explanatory content of the factor over wages. Indeed,
the factor we obtain can explain most of the variability of wages in both sectors. Nevertheless, the
factor cannot account for the income dispersion of the top earners and the gap with respect to the
rest of the population. We extend our identification strategy by estimating a Pareto distribution
for the wages of top earners in the formal sector.
We find that both productivity estimates are increasing in type (the factor) and that the single-
crossing property is satisfied. Specifically, the wedge between the productivity levels of each sector
is almost zero for the least productive agents and increases rapidly as the formal productivity
increases. The main novelty of this section is that we assess the di↵erences between the formal
and the shadow economy at the worker level, controlling for the sorting of workers. Productivity
as measured in La Porta and Shleifer (2008) can come also from the worker characteristics and not
only from the type of firms or jobs in each sector. With our approach we are able to discuss the
wage di↵erential across sectors for a given worker and job. On the other hand, the mapping of our
estimates to productivity levels depends on the structure of the labor and goods market, because
we rely on data on wages rather than quantities produced or profits of the firm; as those other
studies do. For the purposes of this paper this is not important since our object of interest is the
income of the worker in each sector. Our results can shed light on the productive structure of the
two sectors once the link between wages and productivity is specified.18
The remaining of this section is organized as follows: first, we present the data and show how we
identify informal workers. Second, the empirical specification is presented and last, the results are
shown and discussed.
4.1 Data
Our source of information is the household survey (ECH by the Spanish acronym) collected on a
monthly basis by the o cial statistical agency in Colombia (DANE). Our sample is for the year
2013 and comprises 170.000 observations of workers. The sample includes personal information such
as age, gender, years of education and also labor market related variables including hours worked,
18For example, if is assumed that there is perfect competition on the labor market, then our measure corresponds
directly to the worker’s marginal productivity. With the additional assumption of a production function with constant
returns to scale, our measure also reflects the average productivity of the worker.
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number of jobs, type of job, income sources and social security a liation. All of the information is
self-reported by the worker.
The variables we use from the survey can be grouped into 4 categories: worker characteristics,
job characteristics, worker-firm relationship and social security status. A linear combination of the
variables in the first three categories is used to construct a factor that captures the variability of
wages. The fourth category is used to classify individuals as formal or informal workers. Below we
provide a brief description of the variables included in each category, for more detailed information
see Appendix B.
Worker characteristics capture the type of worker. They include: age, gender, education level
and work experience in previous jobs.
Job characteristics describe the type of job and task that the worker does. The variables included
are: number of workers in the firm (size), industry to which the firm belongs, geographical
location of the firm and the task the worker has to do.
Worker-firm relationship involves the information about the type of contract and the wage
determination. The variables included here are: The wage of the worker, number of working
hours, the length of the match, whether the worker is hired through an intermediary firm and
whether the worker belongs to a union.
Social security status determines whether the worker is a liated to social security in its di↵erent
dimensions, and the type of a liation. The variables included are: a liation to the health
system, the pension system and the labor accidents insurance, as well as who pays for the
a liation to each component.
Classification of workers into formal and shadow workers
Colombian regulation provides for labour tax payments (payroll taxes) and the a liation to social
security to be done jointly. Therefore, the a liation status to the social security system reveals
whether the worker’s income is taxed and observed by the government, or shadow. We identify
a formal worker as a worker a liated through his own job to all three main components of labor
protection: the health security system, the pension system and the accidents insurance policy. With
this criteria we estimate that around 58% of the Colombian workers operate in the shadow sector.
When identifying the sector to which the worker belongs we can incur in type I and type II errors,
which are respectively: to classify a worker as shadow when he is formal; and to classify a worker
as formal when he is shadow. The type I error is not relevant as the a liation to the social
security system is itself a tax on workers, so any worker not a liated to the system is by definition
avoiding labor taxes. On the other hand, there could be shadow workers that decide to register to
social security and pay the corresponding contributions, since the a liation through the alternative
subsidized system is mean-tested19 and they might be not eligible. The incentive for a shadow
worker to register and pay is therefore being covered by the health insurance. On the other hand,
19The housing quality of the recipient is also considered as a criterion to be enrolled of the subsidized system
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what induces these workers to remain shadow and misreport their income is paying a lower social
contribution and a consequently lower payroll and income tax. We find that by applying the more
stringent criterion that requires a liation not only to the health but also to the pension system
and the accidents insurance policy we are able to mitigate the possibility of identifying a shadow
worker that registers to social security as a formal worker, as observations with large deviations
between the statutory contributions and the actual contributions tend to be for workers that were
only a liated to one or two of the social security provisions (primarily health) but typically not to
the accidents insurance.
Finally we could also face the case of a formal worker paying all contributions to the social security
system (and being thus classified as formal) but hiding from the government part of his income.
This type of worker does pay taxes, but pays less than the amount imposed by the statutory tax
imposes. In the case of employees this possibility is mitigated, due to the fact that the firm or the
employer are third parties reporting the worker’s income and paying the corresponding taxes to the
government.20 The self-employed workers active in the formal sector are also constrained in their
income misreporting, since their contractors are the third party in charge to pay the honorary tax
to tax authorities belong to the formal sector. In conclusion, we believe that these features of the
Colombian employment reality allow us to follow the structure of the model by defining tax evasion
as working in the shadow economy, while setting aside the aspect of hiding fractions of formal labor
income.
Colombian labor tax scheme
The main components of the Colombian tax/transfers scheme associated with formal labor income
are income taxes, social insurance (payroll) taxes and transfers. First we describe the individual
income tax, then the payroll taxes and then the transfers and subsidies. Using this tax scheme we
proceed to compute the pre-tax income from the reported income by households and consequently
the e↵ective tax rates.
The individual income tax is a progressive tax payable once per year over the total income of one
calendar year. The tax is determined by income brackets, and within each of them a fixed amount
is payed. The first bracket on which the tax is di↵erent from zero starts at 22, 219 dollars (annual
income in 2013 dollars). The tax rate is increasing across brackets and at the last bracket it reaches
27%.
The social insurance taxes are the payroll tax and the health system contribution. For the case of
employees these taxes are payed jointly with the employer; each of the two parties paying a specified
fraction. The sum of both (irrespective of who is in charge of making the payment) corresponds to
a flat tax rate of 22%.
Finally, the bulk of welfare transfers and subsidies in Colombia are granted according to a centralized
system that assigns to each household registered in the system a certain score on an index which
evaluates needs, life standards, and economic status. The index ranges from 0 to 100, and a series
20See for example Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2015) for an exploration of the agency role of firms for the imple-
mentation of labor taxes and a discussion of the greater tax enforcement when there is third party reporting.
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of di↵erent welfare programs use it to assign subsidies and transfers, each one according to its own
threshold. Part of the questionnaire used to compile the index refers to income of the household.
Households have the incentives to misreport income, shadow workers can potentially misreport
income while formal workers can be spotted by the system as the reports are crosschecked with
the government tax agency. We take an average household that belongs to the subsidized system
(meaning the index score is low) (SISBEN) and compute the total transfers it is entitled on that
year by the main social programs available. We calculate that those transfers for a household with
no formal income could be as large as 2000 dollars per year and reduce to zero for an average
household with a full time formal job.
Figure 7 presents the tax scheme decomposed in the three elements discussed and the pre-tax
income distribution recovered from reported income and the tax scheme. We see that transfers are
an important source of income for the poorer households and that the income tax a↵ects a small
fraction of total households.
We have focused on the taxes directly associated with labor income. We do not consider, as they
are not part of the instruments we consider in the model, the excise taxes and the corporate
income taxes (or taxes over capital gains). If we take that excise taxes are only charged over goods
produced in the formal sector and that firms in the formal and shadow economy compete for the
same markets then we have that the tax will completely fall on the worker of the formal economy.
We leave for further research the possibility of using excise taxes in a setup where the link between
goods taxation and labor income has more structure to be analyzed. With our approach we focus
exclusively on the taxes and transfers that have a direct link with labor income.
Measuring Income and Wages
Our analysis assumes that all payroll taxes and social security contributions irrespectively of who
is administratively charged for the tax are a burden on the worker income. A labor tax that has to
be paid by the employer is assumed to be translated in a lower wage for the worker.21 The workers
report their monthly income and the hours worked. To this reported income we input payments
that formal workers are entitled to but which are done in a di↵erent frequency and are not recorded
for the month the survey was conducted. Furthermore, note that we do not include the pension
and unemployment insurance contributions as part of the tax burden but we do include them as
part of the total income of the worker.
The hourly wage is computed then as the total income divided by the numbers of hours worked. If
the worker is a shadow worker we denote it by w˜si and if it is formal then is denoted by w˜
f
i . These
is the key variable that we are going to map to the productivity levels wsi and w
f
i described in the
model.
21This is a standard assumption for pretax income computations. The Congressional Budget O ce in the US uses
the same assumption to compute the e↵ective tax rates.
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Figure 7: The Colombian Labor Tax Scheme
4.2 Empirical specification
The logarithm of both productivities (wfi and w
s
i ) can be written as a function of a single factor Fi
as follows
log
⇣
wfi
⌘
=  f0 +  
f
1Fi (39)
log (wsi ) =  
s
0 +  
s
1Fi (40)
where  j0,  
j
1 characterize the linear function in sector j 2 {f, s}. We set  f1 = 1 without loss of
generality, given that this will just rescale the factor. The factor is a linear combination of a set of
n variables contained in vector Xi with weights given by the vector  . Then we have that
Fi =  Xi (41)
The proxy we have for the model productivities are the wages of workers w˜ji in each sector j, then
we have that22
log
⇣
w˜fi
⌘
= log
⇣
wfi
⌘
+ ufi (42)
log (w˜si ) = log (w
s
i ) + u
s
i (43)
where ufi and u
s
i are random variables with mean zero. Wages are drawn from a probability
distribution where the key location parameters are wfi and w
s
i , the theoretical concepts in our
22Note that, as discussed earlier, wji is only observed if type i works in sector j.
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analysis. In the theoretical analysis we abstract from the underlying variance of the distribution
and focus on the limit when it tends to zero. The model is a static economy so we are not concerned
with short term variations of wages but rather on the distribution of the location parameters across
the population.
Combining equations (39) to (43) we get the specification of the empirical model that corresponds
to
log (w˜i) =  
f
0 + Ii
⇣
 s0    f0
⌘
+ (1 + Ii ( 
s
1   1)) Xi + ui (44)
where Ii is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if type i works in the shadow economy
and ui = Iiusi + u
f
i . We estimate (44) by non-linear least squares.
Ordering of agents and estimated productivities
Note the estimate of parameter a as aˆ. We proceed to order the individuals in our sample with
indexes i 2 [0, 1] such that i < i0 ()  ˆXi <  ˆXi0 . We compute the index of each individual
using the following formula
i =
 ˆXi  mini0{ ˆXi0}
maxi0{ ˆXi0}
that is just rescaling the factor using the minimum and the maximum values it takes in the sample.
The estimated productivities of each type i then correspond to
wˆfi = exp
n
 ˆf0 +  ˆXi
o
(45)
wˆsi = exp
n
 ˆs0 +  ˆ
s
1 ˆXi
o
. (46)
Single-crossing condition
The single-crossing condition states that the ratio wfi /w
s
i is increasing in type. Using (45) and (46)
this ratio can be written as
wˆfi
wˆsi
= exp
n
 ˆf0    ˆs0
o
exp
n
(1   ˆs1)  ˆXi
o
Then, if  ˆs1 < 1 holds, the single-crossing condition is satisfied. Recall that we standardized to
1 the marginal (percentile) increase of formal productivity to a marginal increase in the factor.
Therefore, this condition states that a marginal increase in the factor has to imply a lower marginal
increase in shadow than in formal productivity.
Top income earners
We standardized the time available for labor in a year equal to 1 and therefore we can interpret w˜ji
as the income of worker i for full time work at sector j, then wˆfi corresponds (on average) to the
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maximum income that type i can achieve. Nevertheless, some income observations are above the
maximum value implied by the factor for the most productive worker working full time. That is,
there could be labor income observations yi that satisfy
yi > maxi0{wˆfi0} = wˆf1 (47)
We classify the individuals that satisfy this criterion as top earners. These are individuals with a
very large wage premium that cannot be accounted for with our benchmark specification and for
which the wage does not seem to have the same relationship with the factor as for the rest of the
population.
To characterize with more accuracy this behavior at the top of the income distribution we estimate
the upper tail of the productivity distribution by fitting a Type I Pareto distribution for the gross
wage w˜ of top earners. The support of the distribution is given by
h
wˆf1 ,1
⌘
and the shape parameter
is estimated by maximum likelihood.
A final adjustment has to be made to the index of agents. To fit the top earners in the type space
[0, 1] we compress the indexes on non-top earners to the interval [0, k] and top earners are assigned
to [k, 1] and ordered by their gross wage.
Distribution of types
The assignment of indexes for each observation and their corresponding sampling weights implies a
discrete distribution of workers (non-top earners). The continuous distribution of types is obtained
by a kernel density estimation with a linear interpolation at the evaluation points. The estimated
kernel distribution gives us the distribution of types in the interval [0, k].
For top earners we have a Pareto distribution for productivities with the support [maxi0{wˆf i0},1)
but this distribution can be replicated by di↵erent types distributions in [k, 1] at the types space,
provided that the formal productivities wfi for i 2 [k, 1] are adjusted accordingly. This phenomenon
does not occur with non-top earners because their productivity profiles are given by our parametric
model.
There are two requirements that the distribution of types and productivity profiles of top earners
satisfy always: the total mass of the distribution has to coincide with the mass of top earners and
that limi!1 w
f
i =1.
4.3 Estimation results
Here we discuss the results of the estimation of the formal productivity (wfi ), the informal produc-
tivity (wsi ) and the distribution of types (µi). Parameter estimates for   and the detailed description
of the variables included in Xi are presented in Appendix B.
Figure 8 presents the estimated productivities and the types distribution for non-top earners. The
estimated values of  f0 and  
s
0 are almost identical with  ˆ
s
0 slightly greater so type 0 is slightly more
productive in the shadow economy. The single-crossing condition is supported by the data since the
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hypothesis  s1 < 1 is not rejected at a 1% confidence level. The most productive individual among
non-top earners is almost three times more productive in the formal economy than in the shadow
economy.
Top earners are assigned to the set [0.98, 1], the estimated value of the shape parameter of the
Pareto distribution is 1.81 and comprise a mass of about 1% of the total population (details of
the estimation are presented in Appendix B). The shaded region in Figure 8 corresponds to the
top earners. We do not plot their productivity profiles and density. Recall that what is identified
is the distribution of formal productivities at the top with support [maxi0{wˆf i0},1) and this
can be matched with many di↵erent combinations of formal productivity and probability density
specifications in the types space; all of them equivalent for the optimal taxation problem that solves
the planner. We assume that the relation between the shadow and the formal productivity from
the main part of the distribution of types holds also for the top earners.
Figure 8: Estimated productivities and types distributions
5 Calibrated exercise
Given the productivity schedules estimated in the previous section, we calibrate the utility function
and derive the optimal allocations for Colombia.
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5.1 Calibration of the utility function
We assume that the agents’ utility function is
U (c, n) = log
 
c   n
1+ 1⇣
1 + 1⇣
!
, n 2 [0, 1] . (48)
The parameter ⇣ is the elasticity of labor supply. Since we consider a permanent tax reform, the
relevant notion is the steady-state intensive margin elasticity. We fix ⇣ at di↵erent values and
find   which minimizes the deviation of selected K model moments
 
mmodelk (⇣, )
 K
k=1
from the
corresponding data moments
 
mdatak
 K
k=1
according to the loss function
L (⇣, ) =
KX
k=1
✓
mmodelk (⇣, ) mdatak
mdatak
◆2
. (49)
We use three moments: the share of shadow workers in total employment, the share of shadow
income in total income and the average total income. The first two moments capture the relative
size of the shadow economy, while the third one controls for the total production of Colombia.
Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) recommend using the steady-state intensive elasticity
of 0.33, which we treat as a benchmark. However, the estimates behind this number implicitly
incorporate responses on multiple margins, possibly also shifting labor to the shadow economy.
Since we model this response explicitly, the correct value of elasticity could lower. Hence, we
consider also the values of 0.2 and 0.1. Table 1 shows the matched moments for di↵erent values of
the elasticity of labor supply.
Table 1
Moments Actual economy Model economy for di↵erent values of elasticity ⇣
⇣ = 0.33 ⇣ = 0.2 ⇣ = 0.1
share of
57.99% 64.51% 62.12% 60.53%
shadow workers
share of
30.94% 23.25% 25.24% 26.64%
shadow income
mean total
7166 6673 6659 6677
income [USD]
The model replicates well the magnitude of the shadow economy for a range of elasticities of labor
supply. We conclude that the empirical distribution of productivities and the actual tax schedule
can explain the high level of informality in Colombia.
5.2 Optimal allocations
We find the optimum for the two social welfare functions. First, we use the Rawlsian welfare
criterion, which puts all the weight on the individual with the lowest utility level. Since both
formal and shadow productivities are increasing with type, the Rawlsian planner cares only about
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the lowest type. Second, we derive the Utilitarian optimum with the planner that maximizes the
average utility level in the economy. In each case we require that the planner obtains the same net
tax revenue as the actual tax schedule.
The optimal allocations are described in Table 2. The Rawlsian planner would displace close to
22% of the workforce to informality. The share of shadow income falls even more, since only the
least productive workers end up in the shadow economy. The Utilitarian planner would cut the
size of the informal sector even more, to less than 1%. The Utilitarian planner cares mainly about
workers in the middle of the distribution, where the density of types is high. Hence, this planner
is not willing to set high marginal tax rates at the bottom, as it would reduce the utility of the
workers in the middle. As the tax rate at the bottom is low, few workers are displaced to the
shadow economy.
The welfare gains from implementing the optimum are large. The Rawlsian planner manages to
increase the transfers to the workers with no formal income by 85% in comparison to the actual
tax and transfer system. It translates into welfare gains of 40% to 50% in consumption equivalent
terms. The Utilitarian planner takes into consideration the welfare cost of increased taxation of the
high types and expands the redistribution less. Nevertheless, the transfers received by the bottom
types increase by more than 55% in comparison to the actual tax system in Colombia and welfare
gains are close to of 20% in terms of consumption. In order to make sure that the welfare gains
are not driven by a thick Pareto tail at the top, we recompute the optima without the top tail (see
the last row of Table 2).23 The welfare gains are naturally smaller, since the top earners constitute
a sizable source of tax revenue. However, it is clear that most of the welfare gains come from the
e cient taxation of the ordinary workers and not from the very rich.
Table 2
Moments Actual Optimal Rawlsian allocation Optimal Utilitarian allocation
economy ⇣ = 0.33 ⇣ = 0.2 ⇣ = 0.1 ⇣ = 0.33 ⇣ = 0.2 ⇣ = 0.1
share of
57.99% 21.68% 21.68% 21.68% 0.17% 0.18% 0.19%
shadow workers
share of
30.94% 5.59% 6.33% 6.98% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03%
shadow income
mean total
7165 6671 6967 7112 6825 7086 7245
income [USD]
welfare
100% 151.8% 147.8% 142% 121.3% 120.9% 119.7%
(cons. equiv.)
welfare w/o top tail
100% 136.5% 135% 133.6% 116.8% 117% 117.4%
(cons. equiv.)
Figure 9 demonstrates how the optimal tax schedule is determined. Recall that the shadow economy
imposes an upper bound on the tax rate. If the tax rate of type i exceeds 1   wsi /wfi , the return
to shadow labor is strictly greater than the return to formal labor. No agent of type i would be
willing to supply formal labor at such terms. As is evident from the figure, all bottom types face
tax rate above the upper bound. Hence, they are bunched together at the zero formal income.
23In this case the distribution of types has finite support. The mass of the excluded tail is 0.0045.
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From equation (37) we know that workers who are not bunched face the marginal tax rate that is a
minimum of the two expressions: the standard Mirrleesian tax rate given by a Diamond (1998) and
the upper bound 1   wsi /wfi . In all our calibrations the upper bound plays a dominant role (see
Figure 9). For the Utilitarian planner with elasticity of 0.33 the standard Mirrleesian tax rate dives
under the upper bound just for some high types. For the Rawlsian planner, as well as in the cases of
lower elasticity of labor supply, the Mirrleesian tax rate does not intercept the upper bound below
the upper tail and hence does not influence the optimal tax in the main part of distribution. In
contrast, in all our calibrations some of the upper tail workers are taxed according to the Diamond
(1998) formula (the upper tail is not represented on Figure 9). We conclude that the optimal
tax schedule of workers below the upper tail is predominantly determined by the shadow economy
considerations. However, the usual labor supply responses are important for taxing very productive
workers.
Figure 9: The role of the upper bound
(a) Rawlsian planner (⇣ = 0.33)
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(b) Utilitarian planner (⇣ = 0.33)
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Figure 9 informs us also what would happen if the shadow economy was neglected and the standard
Mirrleesian tax was implemented. All the types for which the tax rate exceeds the upper bound
would be displaced to the shadow economy. Moreover, many types for which the Mirrleesian tax rate
is below the upper bound are likely to move to the shadows as well.24 Hence, the implementation
of the usual tax formula which does not account for the shadow economy would lead to a dramatic
fall in tax revenue.
How does the optimal tax schedule compares with the one implemented at the time in Colombia?
The actual tax schedule involves high 45% marginal rate at low levels of income, implied by phasing-
out of transfers (see Figure 10). As income increases the rate drops to 22% and remains flat - workers
with this income pay only the flat payroll tax. The progressive income tax starts at the high income
level and gradually increases the marginal tax, reaching 49% for the top earners (at income levels
not represented at Figure 10)).25 In comparison to the actual tax rate, the optimal tax rates are
24The tax burden accumulated at the low income levels is likely to outweigh the gain from higher return to formal
labor at the high income levels.
25The progressive tax is a step function with more than 80 steps of varying width and Figure 10 (a) shows its
smoothly approximation. The true tax involves 0 rate at the interior of each step and an unbounded rate between
steps, hence it cannot be represented on such graph.
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lower at low levels of income and much higher elsewhere. Lower marginal rates at the bottom mean
transfers are phased-out more slowly, so less productive workers have less incentives to move to the
informal sector. Higher marginal tax rates elsewhere imply that the richest agents pay much higher
total tax than in the actual economy, which allows the planner to finance the generous transfer
(Figure 10 (b)). The tax rates at lower elasticities have very similar shape, as they are determined
by the upper bound.
Figure 10: The optimal tax schedule
(a) Marginal tax rates (⇣ = 0.33)
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(b) Total tax (⇣ = 0.33)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
x 104
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
formal income [USD]
to
ta
l t
ax
 
 
actual tax
optimal Rawlsian tax
optimal Utilitarian tax
6 Conclusions
A large fraction of the economic activity in most countries is informal. This paper incorporates this
fact into the optimal income tax theory. We find that the shadow economy puts severe restrictions
on the taxes the government can levy, often leading to a welfare loss. However, in some cases
the shadow economy can raise welfare by improving both redistribution and e ciency. If the
informal sector suppresses productivity di↵erences between workers, the government can tax high
earners more when the low productivity workers are employed informally. Furthermore, the shadow
economy shelters poor workers from distortions implied by the taxation of the rich, allowing for
more e cient allocation of labor.
The mechanism proposed has a quantitatively sizable e↵ect. In the case of Colombia, the govern-
ment that cares only about the poor would optimally choose to have 22% of workers in the shadow
economy. Nevertheless, the observed levels of informality are much higher than that. According
to our model, the large size of the Colombian shadow economy is explained by high marginal tax
rates at low levels of income. The optimal tax schedule features lower rates at the bottom, leading
to a smaller informal sector, and higher rates above, raising more revenue from top earners.
This paper suggests that allowing less productive people to collect welfare benefits and simulta-
neously work in the shadow economy could be desirable. Moreover, policies designed to deter the
creation of informal jobs should focus on the jobs taken by the workers with the potential for high
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formal earnings. It is important to stress that the way the shadow economy is modeled in this
paper abstracts from many issues, such as competition between formal and informal firms, lack of
regulation and law enforcement, as well as potential negative externalities caused by the informal
activity. All those phenomena are likely to reduce the potential welfare gains from exploiting the
shadow economy.
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A Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Omitted. ⇤
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Proof of Proposition 2. Note that the first-best allocation is consistent with the additional
constraint (5), hence it is the solution to the planner’s problem. Essentially, conditional on truthfully
revealing type, incentives of the agent and the planner regarding the shadow labor are perfectly
aligned. If a given type pays taxes according to the true type, choosing shadow labor in order to
maximize utility cannot hurt the social welfare. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 3. In the first-best, U (cL, nL)   U (cH , nH) . By assumption of v0 (0) = 0,
we know that nfL > 0. Then the utility of H mimicking L is U
⇣
cL,
wfL
wfH
nfL
⌘
> U
⇣
cL, n
f
L
⌘
 
U (cH , nH) , which violates ICH,L. Hence, the optimum is not the first-best.
Suppose that at the optimum ICH,L does not bind. First, let’s consider the case in which U (cH , nH) >
U (cL, nL) . Since ICH,L is slack, the planner may increase transfers from H to L, which raises
welfare, so it could not be the optimum in the first place. Second, suppose that U (cL, nL)  
U (cH , nH) . It can happen only if nsL > 0. Otherwise, as we have shown above, ICH,L is violated.
If nsL > 0 and ICH,L is slack, the planner can marginally decrease n
s
L and increase n
f
L, which
generates free resources. Hence, at the optimum ICH,L has to bind.
Suppose that ICL,H binds. If the resource constraint is satisfied as equality, it may happen only
if L type is paying a positive tax, while H type receives a transfer. Then the planner can improve
welfare by canceling the redistribution altogether and reverting to laissez-fare, where none of the
incentive constraints bind. ⇤
Lemma A.1. At the optimum either U (cL, nL) = U (cH , nH) and nsL > 0, or the following opti-
mality condition holds
min
(
v0 (nL)
wfL
 
 
µL + µH
v0 (nH,L)
wfH
!
, nfL
)
= 0, (50)
where ni, i =
wf i
wfi
nf i+n
s
i
✓
wf i
wfi
nf i
◆
is the total labor supply of type i pretending to be of type  i.
Suppose that v00 is nondecreasing. If w
f
H
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL) then this optimality condition is su cient
for the optimum.
Proof of Lemma A.1. If U (cL, nL) = U (cH , nH) and nsL = 0, then such allocation is not
incentive compatible. The proof is identical as the proof of the claim that the first-best is not
incentive compatible in Proposition 3. Hence, if U (cL, nL) = U (cH , nH), then nsL > 0.
Let’s consider the case in which U (cH , nH) is always greater than U (cL, nL) . ICH,L has to bind,
otherwise the planner could equalize utilities of both types. Consider changing nfL by a small
amount and adjusting TL such that ICH,L is satisfied as equality. It means that
dTL
dnfL
= wfLµH
 
1  v
0 (nH,L)
wfH
!
.
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This perturbation a↵ects social welfare by
dU (cL, nL)
dnfL
= wfL  
@TL
@nfL
  v0 (nL) = wfL
 
µL + µH
v0 (nH,L)
wfH
!
  v0 (nL) .
Optimum requires that either dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
= 0 or dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
< 0 and nfL = 0, which results in (50).
Su ciency of this first order condition depends on the second order derivative of welfare with respect
to the perturbation. In order to have the second derivative well behaved, we are going to assume that
v00 is nondecreasing. Then, we need to consider two cases (see Table 3). If w
f
H
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL) holds,
then dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
is non-increasing in nfL. It means that the optimality condition (50) is su cient. If
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < g (w
s
L) , then
dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
is not monotone in nfL and it may be the case that (50) points
at either local maximum which is not a global maximum, or at the local minimum.
Table 3: Second order derivative of welfare with respect to the perturbation
The case of
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL)
nfL < g (w
s
L) g (w
s
L) < n
f
L <
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < n
f
L
d2U(cL,nL)
dnf2L
= 0  v00
⇣
nfL
⌘
< 0 µH
⇣
wfL
wfH
⌘2
v00
⇣
wfL
wfH
nfL
⌘
  v00
⇣
nfL
⌘
< 0
The case of
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < g (w
s
L)
nfL <
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < n
f
L < g (w
s
L) g (w
s
L) < n
f
L
d2U(cL,nL)
dnf2L
= 0 µH
⇣
wfL
wfH
⌘2
v00
⇣
wfL
wfH
nfL
⌘
> 0 µH
⇣
wfL
wfH
⌘2
v00
⇣
wfL
wfH
nfL
⌘
  v00
⇣
nfL
⌘
< 0
Figure 11 shows these two cases. In the first panel
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL) holds and the optimality
condition (50) always points at the optimum (in this case, the value of nfL where
dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
= 0).
In the second panel
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < g (w
s
L) holds and the optimality condition is not su cient. There
are three points that satisfy condition (50): local maximum at nfL = 0, local minimum with
nfL 2
⇣
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) , g (w
s
L)
⌘
and the other local maximum with nfL > g (w
s
L) . ⇤
Proof of Proposition 4. In the proof of Lemma A.1 above we described the impact of changing
formal labor of L on the social welfare, dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
. The condition (10) describes situations when the
impact of the perturbation is non-positive at nfL = 0. From Figure 11 it is clear that if it is not the
case, type L will never optimally work in the shadow economy.
Suppose that
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL) . Condition (10) implies that dU(cL,nL)dnfL is always non-positive, so
it is optimal to reduce nfL as long as U (cH , nH) > U (cL, nL) . From Lemma A.1 we know also that
U (cH , nH) > U (cL, nL) if L works only formally, so it is optimal to place type L in the shadow
economy.
Now suppose that
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < g (w
s
L) . Condition (11) means that the maximum of
dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
attained at nfL = g (w
s
L) (see Figure 11) is non-positive. Therefore, it is optimal to reduce n
f
L until
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Figure 11: Su ciency of the optimality condition
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utilities of both types are equalized, which can happen only when L works in the shadow economy.
Condition (11) is su cient, but not necessary for L to work in the shadow economy, because the
social welfare changes in a non-monotone way with nfL. If (11) is not satisfied, marginally increasing
nsL from 0 is bad for welfare, but increasing it further may eventually lead to welfare gains, and the
total e↵ect on welfare is ambiguous. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that optimally nsL > 0. From Figure 11 it is clear that in such
situation it is in the best interest of type L to work exclusively in the shadow economy. However,
if wsL > w
s
H and n
f
L = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint of the type H implies that
U (cL, nL) = U (w
s
Ln
s
L   TL, nsL) > U
 
wsHn
s
H,L   TL, nsH,L
 
= U (cH , nH) .
Since the planner is Rawlsian, such allocation is not desirable. The planner will rather stop de-
creasing nfL at the point where utilities of both types are equal. On the other hand, if w
s
L  wsH
then
U (cL, nL) = U (w
s
Ln
s
L   TL, nsL)  U
 
wsHn
s
H,L   TL, nsH,L
 
= U (cH , nH) ,
so the planner will optimally decrease nfL to zero. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 6. In order to examine when the optimum welfare is strictly higher than
in the standard Mirrlees model, we will compare utility of type L in the standard Mirrlees model 
U
 
cML , n
M
L
  
and in the shadow economy model, when L is working only in the shadow economy 
U
 
cSEL , n
SE
L
  
. Clearly, when the second scenario yields higher utility, the existence of the shadow
economy is welfare improving.
In the standard Mirrlees model, the binding constraint is U
⇣
wfHn
M
H , n
M
H
⌘
 TMH = U
⇣
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
⌘
 
TML . Together with the resource constraint it means that T
M
L = µH
⇣
U
⇣
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
⌘
  U
⇣
wfHn
M
H , n
M
H
⌘⌘
.
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Now, the utility of type L is
U
 
cML , n
M
L
 
= U
⇣
wfLn
M
L , n
M
L
⌘
 TL = U
⇣
wfLn
M
L , n
M
L
⌘
 µH
 
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U
⇣
wfHn
M
H , n
M
H
⌘!
.
Using the same steps, we can express the utility of type L working only in the shadow economy as
U
 
cSEL , n
SE
L
 
= U
 
wsLn
SE
L , n
SE
L
   µH ⇣U  wsHnSEH,L, nSEH,L   U ⇣wfHnSEH , nSEH ⌘⌘ .
Since there are no distortions at the top and no wealth e↵ects, nMH = n
SE
H . The shadow economy is
welfare improving, U
 
cSEL , n
SE
L
   U  cML , nML   > 0, i↵
U
 
wsLn
SE
L , n
SE
L
   U ⇣wfLnML , nML ⌘+ µH
 
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U  wsHnSEH,L, nSEH,L 
!
> 0.
The first di↵erence (the e ciency gain) is positive if wsL > w¯
s
L. The second di↵erence (the redistri-
bution gain) is positive when wsH < w¯
s
H . Hence, when both inequalities hold weakly and at least one
holds strictly, the existence of the shadow economy improves welfare in comparison to the standard
Mirrlees model.
Now we will show that when the inequalities hold in the other direction, the shadow economy hurts
welfare. Suppose that wsL = w¯
s
L and w
s
H = w¯
s
H . We will prove that allocation
SE is a unique
optimum at this point. First we will show that when the redistribution gain is non-positive, it is
true that nSEH >
wfL
wfH
nML . Suppose on the contrary that n
SE
H  w
f
L
wfH
nML . Then we can write the
following sequence of inequalities
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U
⇣
wfHn
SE
H , n
SE
H
⌘
> U
 
wsHn
SE
H , n
SE
H
 
.
The first inequality comes from the fact that
wfL
wfH
nML is below the e cient level of labor supply of
type H, so lowering the labor of this type even further to nSEH will decrease the utility. The second
inequality is simply implied by our assumption wfH > w
s
H . This sequence of inequalities implies
that the redistribution gain is strictly positive. Hence, if the redistribution gain is non-positive,
nSEH >
wfL
wfH
nML holds.
Note that nSEH >
wfL
wfH
nML means that the optimal allocation of the standard Mirrlees model is not
incentive-compatible with the shadow economy - deviating type H would supply some additional
shadow labor. Hence, any allocation which yields the social welfare equal or higher than U
 
cML , n
M
L
 
has to involve type L working in the shadow economy.
Let’s go back to the optimal allocation with the shadow economy, when wsL = w¯
s
L and w
s
H = w¯
s
H .
From the considerations above we know that the optimum involves some shadow labor. If we sum
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the e ciency gain and the redistribution gain divided by µH and rearrange the terms, we get 
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U
⇣
wfLn
M
L , n
M
L
⌘!
   U  wsHnSEH , nSEH    U  wsLnSEL , nSEL    = 0.
The expression in the first brackets is positive. Hence, the second brackets are positive as well,
which means that wsH > w
s
L. By Proposition 5 type L will work exclusively in the shadow economy.
To sum up, we know that at (wsL, w
s
H) = (w¯
s
L, w¯
s
H) the optimum of the shadow economy model is
unique and involves type L working entirely in the shadow economy. Consequently, a decrease in
the shadow productivity of type L or an increase in the shadow productivity of type H leads to
a strict welfare loss, since it either decreases the e↵ective productivity of type L or decreases the
transfer type L receives. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that  i    i. In this case the ICi, i may bind (it will if the
inequality is strict), while IC i,i is always slack. The planner will not distort the allocation of type
i. Without distortions, this type will never work in the shadow economy.
Suppose that  i >   i, so that IC i,i binds. Perturb n
f
i and adjust Ti such that IC i,i holds as
equality:
dTi
dnfi
= wfi µ i
 
1  v
0 (n i,i)
wf i
!
.
This perturbation a↵ects social welfare by
dW
dnfi
=  iµi
⇣
wfi   @Ti@nfi   v
0 (ni)
⌘
+   iµ i µiµ i
@Ti
@nfi
=  iµiw
f
i
✓⇣
1  v0(ni)
wfi
⌘
+
⇣
  i
 i
  1
⌘
µ i
✓
1  v0(n i,i)
wf i
◆◆ (51)
Suppose that
ws i
wf i
  wsi
wfi
and nfi  g (wsi ), which means that v0 (ni) = wsi . Note that v
0(n i,i)
wf i
 
ws i
wf i
  wsi
wfi
. Hence
1  w
s
i
wfi
  1  v
0 (n i,i)
wf i
>
✓
1    i
 i
◆
µ i
 
1  v
0 (n i,i)
wf i
!
,
which means that dW
dnfi
> 0. Therefore, it is never optimal to decrease nfi so much that type i works
in the shadow economy. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 8. First we will show how to obtain (16). The e ciency gain is straight-
forward. In order to obtain the redistribution gain, note that there are no distortions imposed on
type  i, hence
µ i  i
 
U
 
cSE i , n
SE
 i
   U  cM i, nM i   = µ i  i  TM i   TSE i   =  µi  i  TMi   TSEi   .
44
Summing up the terms results in (16). In order to derive thresholds, recall that H (ws) =
U (wsg (ws) , g (ws)). The e ciency gain is given by
µi i
⇣
H (wsi )  U
⇣
wfi n
M
i , n
M
i
⌘⌘
,
it is strictly increasing in wsi and positive for w
s
i > w¯
s
i. Note that by (51) nMi will always be
distorted (downwards if i = l, upwards if i = h). Hence, U
⇣
wfi n
M
i , n
M
i
⌘
< H
⇣
wfi
⌘
and the
threshold w¯si is strictly lower than w
f
i .
Using the binding IC i,i constraint, we can express the redistribution gain as
µiµ i ( i     i)
 
U
 
wfi n
M
i ,
wfi
wf i
nMi
!
 H  ws i 
!
.
It is strictly decreasing in ws i and is positive for ws i < w¯s i. Since
wfi
wf i
nMi 6= g
⇣
wf i
⌘
, it is true
that U
✓
wfi n
M
i ,
wfi
wf i
nMi
◆
< H
⇣
wf i
⌘
and the threshold w¯s i is strictly lower than w
f
 i. ⇤
A Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. The single-crossing requires that ddi
✓
@Vi(yf ,T)/@yf
@Vi(yf ,T )/@T
◆
< 0. Suppose that
v0
⇣
yf
 i
⌘
<  i. Then the agent supplies no informal labor and the indirect utility function V is just
the utility function U evaluated at the formal allocation. Since v0 is increasing, the single crossing
holds in this case. When v0
⇣
yf
 i
⌘
   i, then the optimal provision of informal labor means that
v0 (ni) = w
f
i , which implies
@Vi(yf ,T)/@yf
@Vi(yf ,T )/@T
= w
s
i
wfi
. Therefore the single crossing condition requires
that ddi
⇣
wsi
wfi
⌘
< 0. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 9. First note that the incentive compatibility requires that if ddjVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
exists, it is equal to 0. Otherwise type i can improve welfare by changing income marginally, so the
allocation is not incentive compatible. Hence, if ddiVi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
= ddjVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
+ ddiVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
exists, it is equal to ddiVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
=
⇣
w˙fi
wfi
nfi +
w˙si
wsi
nsi
⌘
v0 (ni) . We call this derivative a marginal
information rent and denote it simply by V˙i.
By Milgrom and Segal (2002) (see their 10th footnote and Theorem 2), we can represent the utility
schedule for any i < 1 as an integral of marginal information rents
Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
= V0
⇣
yf0 , T0
⌘
+
ˆ i
0
V˙jdj,
Moreover, the utility schedule Vi is continuous everywhere and di↵erentiable almost everywhere.
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Now we will show that the allocation is not incentive compatible if the formal income is decreasing
in type. Suppose that the allocation is incentive-compatible and that there are two types a < b
such that yfa > y
f
b . By the incentive compatibility, we have
Va
 
yfa , Ta
    Va ⇣yfb , Tb⌘ . (52)
d
diVi
 
yf , T
 
is increasing in yf . To see it, note that
d
di
Vi
 
yf , T
 
=
 
⇢fi
yf
wf i
+ ⇢si max
(
g (wsi ) 
yf
wfi
, 0
)!
v0 (ni) ,
where g is the inverse function of v0. The single-crossing implies that ⇢fi > ⇢
s
i , so the right hand
side is increasing in yf .
Since yfa > y
f
b , for each type i it is true that
d
diVi
 
yfa , Ta
 
> ddiVi
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
. It implies
Vb
 
yfa , Ta
   Va  yfa , Ta  = ˆ b
a
d
di
Vi
 
yfa , Ta
 
di >
ˆ b
a
d
di
Vi
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
di = Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
  Va
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
.
(53)
Summing (52) and (53) results in
Vb
 
yfa , Ta
 
> Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
,
which contradicts the incentive-compatibility. Therefore, a nondecreasing formal income schedule
is necessary for incentive compatibility. Conversely, suppose that the local incentive constraints
hold and the formal income schedule is nondecreasing. Then for any two types a < b < 1
Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
  Va
 
yfa , Ta
 
=
ˆ b
a
d
di
Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
di  
ˆ b
a
d
di
Vi
 
yfa , Ta
 
di = Vb
 
yfa , Ta
   Va  yfa , Ta  ,
(54)
which implies
Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
  Vb
 
yfa , Ta
 
.
We can use the same reasoning, but bound the utility di↵erence on the left hand side of (54) from
above by
´ b
a
d
diVi
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
di to get
Va
 
yfa , Ta
    Va ⇣yfb , Tb⌘ .
We cannot use this argument when b = 1 and wf1 is unbounded, but then by continuity of Vi we
have limb!1
n
Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
  Vb
 
yfa , Ta
 o   0. ⇤
Proof of Theorem 1. First we will derive Dfi and D
s
i term. Then we will show that conditions
from the theorem are necessary. Finally we will prove su ciency.
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Suppose that i 2 F . A perturbation of formal income changes the marginal information rent of
type i by
@V˙i
@yfi
= (1  ti) ⇢fi
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆
. (55)
where ⇣i =
v0(ni)
niv00(ni) is the elasticity of labor supply. This change of income a↵ects the utility level
of type i by dVi
dyfi
= 1   v0(ni)
wfi
. By Proposition 9 the utility schedule has to be continuous, so we
have to introduce additional change in tax Ti in order to keep the utility level of type i constant.
We adjusts the total tax paid by an agent of type i by dTi = 1  v
0(ni)
wfi
. Note that dTi is just equal
the marginal tax rate ti. This perturbation influences the tax revenue as if we were decreasing the
formal income of type i while keeping the marginal tax rate fixed. Since we are interested in the
tax revenue impact of the unit perturbation of the marginal information rent, we normalize dTi by
@V˙i
@y . In order to capture the tax revenue impact of perturbation of all agents of type i, we multiply
this expression by µi and get
Dfi = dTi
 
@V˙i
@yfi
! 1
µi =
ti
1  ti
✓
⇢fi
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆◆ 1
µi.
Suppose that i 2 S. Shadow labor is supplied according to v0 (ni) = wsi =) ni = g (wsi ) . The
marginal information rent can be expressed as
V˙i =
0B@ w˙fi⇣
wfi
⌘2 yfi + w˙iswsi
 
g (wsi ) 
yfi
wfi
!1CAwsi . (56)
We marginally perturb yfi . The impact of the perturbation of the marginal information rent is
dV˙i
dyfi
=
⇣
⇢fi   ⇢si
⌘ wsi
wfi
.
As in the formal workers’ case, the perturbation of yfi alone changes the utility level of type i. In
order to keep the utility schedule continuous at i, we need to adjust the tax Ti such that the utility
of this type is unchanged. The required change of the tax is dTi = 1  v
0(ni)
wfi
, which for the shadow
worker equals
wfi  wsi
wfi
. By multiplying the tax revenue change with µi and normalizing it with
dV˙i
dyf ,
we obtain the tax revenue cost of decreasing the marginal information rent of type i:
Dsi = dTi
 
@V˙i
@yfi
! 1
µi =
wfi   wsi
wsi
⇣
⇢fi   ⇢si
⌘ 1
µi.
If the interior formal income is nondecreasing, the interior allocation implied is incentive-compatible.
The necessity of the conditions (30)-(33) was demonstrated in the main text. If these conditions
do not hold, there exists a beneficial perturbation.
The conditions (30)-(33) are su cient when they pin down the unique interior allocation. This
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happens when the cost of distortions is decreasing in the formal income of each type. Then the
government’s problem of choosing formal income of each type is concave. For formal workers it
requires that ⇣i is non-increasing in the labor supply, as then increasing the marginal tax rate ti
leads to an increase in Dfi . For the marginal workers we need D
s
i > D
f
i , which is guaranteed by
⇢si
⇢fi
> ⇣ 1i . See the footnote 11 for the comment regarding the uniqueness of allocation for types for
which Dsi =
´ 1
i Njdj holds. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 10. We will examine the monotonicity of an interior formal income sched-
ule separately for the formal, marginal and shadow workers.
The single-crossing condition implies that if the marginal tax rate is non-increasing in type, the
formal income of workers in F is increasing. By (30) the marginal tax rate satisfies
ti
1  ti = ⇢
f
i
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆
1 M i
µi
E (1  !j | j > i) . (57)
Assumption 3(i) means that E (1  !j | j > i) = E
⇣
1   j⌘
    j > i⌘ is non-increasing in i. Assump-
tions 3(ii) and 3(iii) imply that the rest of the right hand side of (57) is non-increasing in i. Hence,
ti is non-increasing and the interior formal income schedule is increasing in F .
For any marginal worker i the formal income is fixed at wfi g (w
s
i ) . The derivative of formal income
with respect to type is
y˙fi =
dwfi g (w
s
i )
di
= w˙fi g
⇣
wfi
⌘
+ wfi w˙
s
i g
0 (wsi ) = w
f
i g (w
s
i )
✓
⇢fi + ⇢
s
i
wsi g
0 (wsi )
g (wsi )
◆
.
Notice that w
s
i g
0(wsi )
g(wsi )
= v
0(ni)
niv00(ni) = ⇣i. Hence, for any marginal worker y˙
f
i   0 if and only if ⇢fi +⇢si ⇣i  
0, ⇢si
⇢fi
   ⇣ 1i .
In the interior allocation all shadow workers have zero formal income. Hence, the formal income
schedule is non-decreasing only if shadow workers are present exclusively at the bottom of the type
space. According to (32), a worker i belongs to S in an interior allocation if and only if
wfi   wsi
wsi
 ⇢fi
1 Mi
µi
 
1  ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
!
E (1  !j | j > i) .
The left hand side is increasing in i by the single-crossing assumption. The right hand side is
non-increasing by assumptions 3(i), 3(ii) and 3(iv).⇤
Proof of Proposition 2. We will show that under the assumptions made the interior allocation
is such that bottom types do not work in the shadow economy, while some types above them do.
This leads to the income schedule locally decreasing in type.
Let’s compute the term
´ 1
i Njdj. By (33) we know that ⌘ = E { i} = 1. Hence
´ 1
i Njdj =´ 1
i (1   j) dj and the derivative of this term is
@
´ 1
i Njdj
@i =  i   1.
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The term Dsi is
Dsi =
 
wf0
ws0
e(⇢
f ⇢s)i   1
! 
⇢f   ⇢s  1 .
By (32) any type i is a shadow worker in the interior allocation if and only if
´ 1
i Njdj   Dsi . We
can rewrite this inequality as
ws0  
e(⇢
f ⇢s)i
1 + (⇢f   ⇢s) ´ 1i Njdj
wf0 .
Denote the right hand side by Xi. Note that X0 = 1, which together with w
f
0 > w
s
0 implies that
the bottom types do not work in the shadow economy and by the Assumption 1(iii) have a positive
formal income.
We define the threshold w¯s0 as mini2[0,1]Xi. In order to see that w¯s0 < w
f
0 , let’s compute the
derivative of Xi :
X˙i =
 
⇢f   ⇢s  e(⇢f ⇢s)i✓2   i +  ⇢f   ⇢s  ˆ 1
i
Njdj
◆
.
Note that X˙0 =
 
⇢f   ⇢s  (2   i) < 0, so Xi is decreasing at the bottom type and mini2[0,1]Xi <
X0 = w
f
0 . Therefore, whenever w
f
0 > w
s
0 > w¯
s
0, the bottom types have a positive formal income,
while some types above them work in the shadow economy and have no formal income. ⇤
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. There are three cases we should consider, depending on whether the interior formal income
is increasing, locally decreasing, or increasing but not strictly. In the first case (strictly increasing
schedule) by Theorem 1 the interior allocation is optimal. In the second case (locally decreasing
schedule) by Theorem 2 we need to use the optimal bunching condition (35). Below we derive this
condition formally. In the third case the interior income schedule is non-decreasing with flat parts.
By Theorem 1 the interior allocation is optimal. However, Theorem 2 says that the flat parts of
the income schedule should be consistent with the optimal bunching condition (35). We will show
that those two approaches are equivalent.
Suppose that the formal income schedule yf is constant at the segment of types [a, b] . Let’s
marginally decrease the formal income of types [a, b). Since we don’t change the allocation of
types below a, we have to make sure that Va is unchanged - otherwise the utility schedule becomes
discontinuous. Together with the cut of the formal income, we have to introduce a change in the
total tax paid at this income level dTa = 1  v
0(ni)
wfi
= ta  . Since all types [a, b) are a↵ected, the tax
revenue loss is equal to
ta (Mb  Ma) . (58)
Although this perturbation does not a↵ect the utility of type a, it does a↵ect the utility of all
other bunched types. The utility impact of the perturbation of some type i 2 (a, b) equals dUi =
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1  v0(ni)
wfi
  dTa = v
0(na)
 a
  v0(ni) i . The welfare loss of bunched agents due to this utility change is
ˆ b
a
 MRSi!idµ, (59)
where  MRSi =
v0(na)
 a
  v0(ni) i . Having the fiscal and welfare loss at the kink, we can add them
into a cost of increasing distortions at the bunch [a, b). We normalize the sum by tb+   ta  , which
makes sure that the perturbation results in the unit change of the utility of type b, and we obtain
(34). As the perturbation results in a uniform utility change of agents above the bunch, we can use
the standard term (27) in order to obtain the optimal bunching condition (35).
Suppose that the interior formal income schedule is flat on the segment [a, b] . We will prove the
equivalence of the interior optimality conditions and the optimal bunching condition. Let’s consider
the following sequence of perturbations. First, decrease the marginal information rent of agent a
such that the formal income of this type falls by a unit. Take a marginally higher type and again
perturb the marginal information rent such that the formal income of this agents is decreased by
a unit as well. Do it until you reach type b. Note that incentive compatibility is preserved at
each stage, since the formal income is always non-decreasing. The aggregate welfare impact of this
sequence of perturbations is
Winterior =
ˆ b
a
@V˙i
@y
✓
Di  
ˆ 1
i
Njdj
◆
di,
where Di ⌘
8<:D
f
i if i2 F
Dsi if i2 S
. We do not need to consider the marginal workers, because their formal
income is increasing (see the proof of Proposition 10), hence they cannot be bunched. We can
decompose Winterior into three components
Winterior =
ˆ b
a
@V˙i
@y
Didi| {z }  
ˆ b
a
@V˙i
@y
ˆ b
i
Njdjdi| {z }  
ˆ b
a
@V˙i
@y
ˆ 1
b
Njdjdi| {z } .
X1 X2 X3
Note thatDi =
1 MRSi
@V˙i
@y
µi, henceX1 =
´ c
a (1 MRSi)µidi.We observe that @V˙i@y = @
2Vi
@i@y =   ˙MRSi
and we integrate X2 by parts
X2 =  
ˆ b
a
˙MRSi
ˆ b
i
Njdjdi =  
0@"MRSi ˆ b
i
Njdj
#b
a
+
ˆ b
a
MRSiNidi
1A =   ˆ b
a
(MRSi  MRSa)Nidi.
We simply integrate X3
X3 =  
ˆ b
a
˙MRSi
ˆ 1
b
Njdjdi =   (MRSb  MRSa)
ˆ 1
b
Njdj.
50
Now by summing and rearranging the terms we get
Winterior = X1  X2  X3
=
´ b
a (1 MRSi) dµ+
´ b
a (MRSi  MRSa) (1  !i) dµ+ (MRSb  MRSa)
´ 1
b Njdj
=
´ b
a (1 MRSa) dµ+
´ b
a (MRSa  MRSi)!idµ+ (MRSb  MRSa)
´ 1
b Njdj
= ta  (Mb  Ma) +
´ b
a  MRSi!idµ+ (ta    tb+)
´ 1
b Njdj = (tb+   ta )
⇣
Da,b  
´ 1
b Njdj
⌘
.
Since tb+   ta  = v
0(na)
 a
  v0(nb) b > 0, the sequence of interior optimality conditions is equivalent to
the optimal bunching condition (35).
Proof of Proposition 11. If the interior allocation is incentive-compatible, the claim holds.
Suppose that it is not the case, i.e. there is a kink in the tax schedule. In this case incentive
compatibility constrains the government from reducing the utility of agents above kink as much as
in the interior case. Since G is concave, it means that Nj terms for j above the kink is weakly higher
and the government’s will to impose distortions does not decrease. If there are shadow workers at
the bottom and the curve
´ 1
i Njdj shifts upwards, then even more types will be bunched at zero
formal income at the bottom.
Let’s think about shadow workers which are not at the bottom of the type space. The continuity
assumptions guarantee that Dsi and
´ 1
i Njdj terms are continuous in type. It implies that before any
set of shadow workers that are not at the bottom of the type space is a marginal worker. Consider
an interior allocation with a bunch of shadow workers at some positive formal income level. If we
flatten the interior formal income schedule in order to make it non-decreasing (as in Figure 6), the
first type in the bunch (type a¯) will be a marginal worker (
v0
✓
ya¯
w
f
a¯
◆
wsa¯
= 1), while all the other types
with this level of formal income will be shadow workers (
v0
✓
ya¯
w
f
i
◆
wsi
< 1, i > a¯). To see this, note that
@
@i
0@ v0✓ ya¯wfi ◆
wsi
1A is negative by ⇢si
⇢fs
>  ⇣ 1. So far we discussed what happens at the flattened income
schedule. The optimal income schedule involves no less distortions, so the shadow workers will not
cease to supply shadow labor. ⇤
Proof of Corollary 2. It is just an interior optimality condition for the shadow worker (32). By
Lemma 11, all the shadow workers from the interior allocation are shadow workers in the optimum.
⇤
B The estimation of the factor Fi and top earners Pareto
distribution.
Here we present the variables included in the vector Xi and the parameter estimates of   and  
obtained from the specification given by (44). Table 4 lists the variables included in Xi with its
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Table 4: Variables included in Xi
Variable Description Values
Worker characteristics
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 for women 0-1
Age Age of the worker 16-90
Age2 Age squared
Ed years Number of education years 0-26
Degree Highest degree achieved
1-5
1 - no degree
5 - postgraduate degree
Y work Number of months worked in the last year 1-12
Experience Number of months worked in the last job 0-720
First job Dummy for the first job (1 if it is the first job) 0-1
Production unit (firm) characteristics
Sector Man Dummy for the manufacturing sector 0-1
Sector Fin Dummy for financial intermediation 0-1
Sector ret Dummy for the sales and retailers sector 0-1
Big city Dummy for a firm in one of the two largest cities 0-1
Size Categories for the number of workers
1-9
1 - One worker
9 - More than 101 workers
Production unit (Type of job) characteristics
Lib Dummy for a liberal occupation 0-1
Admin Dummy for an administrative task 0-1
Seller Dummy for sellers and related 0-1
Services Dummy for a service task (bartender ..) 0-1
Worker-firm relationship
Union Dummy for labor union a liation (1 if yes) 0-1
Agency Dummy for agency hiring (1 if yes) 0-1
Seniority Number of months of the worker in the firm 0-720
corresponding description and associated category. The parameter estimates are presented in Table
5. Finally, table 6 presents the estimate of the Pareto distribution for top earners.
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Table 5: Estimation results
Parameter Point estimate std. error t-statistic 95% conf. interval
 f0 6.859 0.033 211.9 6.89 7.02
 s0    f0 0.102 0.032 -3.2 -0.16 -0.04
 s1 0.682 0.037 12.6 0.648 0.716
 -Gender -0.077 0.005 -11.6 -0.06 -0.04
 -Age 0.025 0.001 13.1 0.01 0.02
 -Age2 0.000 0.000 -8.8 0.00 0.00
 -Ed years 0.037 0.002 15.4 0.02 0.03
 -Degree 0.156 0.005 21.1 0.10 0.12
 -Sector Man -0.098 0.006 -11.9 -0.08 -0.06
 -Sector Fin 0.156 0.015 6.9 0.08 0.14
 -Sector ret -0.150 0.006 -16.9 -0.11 -0.09
 -Big city 0.010 0.007 1.0 -0.01 0.02
 -Size 0.032 0.001 18.7 0.02 0.02
 -Union 0.126 0.010 8.3 0.07 0.11
 -Agency -0.144 0.005 -18.3 -0.11 -0.09
 -Seniority 0.001 0.000 17.9 0.00 0.00
 -Y work 0.029 0.001 18.4 0.02 0.02
 -First job -0.053 0.008 -4.7 -0.05 -0.02
 -Experience 0.000 0.000 5.3 0.00 0.00
 -Lib 0.074 0.013 3.9 0.03 0.08
 -Admin -0.272 0.009 -19.9 -0.20 -0.17
 -Seller -0.186 0.014 -9.2 -0.15 -0.10
 -Services -0.267 0.009 -19.3 -0.20 -0.16
Table 6: Pareto distribution estimates
Parameter Point estimate std. error z-statistic 95% conf. interval
Shape parameter 1.81 0.0018 953.34 1.806 1.833
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